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Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly:
Examining Aspects of Shareholder
Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating
Ethical Regulation and Laws of
General Applicability
Theresa A. Gabaldon*
INTRODUCTION
The term ethical popularly is understood to have reference
to some underlying system of moral principles.1 Nonetheless, a
number of the recognized rules of conduct for lawyers, gener-
ally referred to as ethical regulations, are devoid of moral con-
tent.2 Some of these rules proscribe certain activities in order
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I would
like to thank the University of Colorado for providing the support necessary to
produce this Article. I also acknowledge, with gratitude, the research assist-
ance of Thomas Carberry and the comments of Mark Loewenstein. I owe spe-
cial acknowledgement to the invaluable insights and efforts of Robert Palmer.
1. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY" 780 (1986)
(defining ethics as "the discipline dealing with good and bad or right and
wrong or with moral duty and obligation").
2. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs § 2.71, at 68 (1986) (stating
that "[m]ost of what is called 'legal ethics' is really discourse on the law of pro-
fessional regulation"); see also WEBSTER'S THmID NEw INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 780 (1986) (giving as secondary definition of ethics: "the principles of
conduct governing an individual or a profession").
Interestingly, both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code"), promulgated by the American Bar Association ("ABA") in 1969, and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), promulgated by the
ABA in 1983, seem to assume that conduct appropriately subject to regulation
is separate from matters of morality (which ethical regulations also may refer
to as matters of "ethics"), but that the former is in some sense a subset of the
latter. Thus, the Model Code is composed of Disciplinary Rules ("DRs"),
which it declares to be mandatory statements of minimally acceptable conduct,
and Ethical Considerations ("ECs"), which it describes as "aspirational in char-
acter and [representing] the objectives toward which every member of the pro-
fession should strive." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Preliminary Statement (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; see generally Sutton,
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Intro-
duction, 48 TEx. L. REV. 255, 258 (1970) (summarizing Model Code); Frankel,
Book Review, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 874, 877 (1976) (reviewing Model Code). The
"Scope" statement of the Model Rules provides that "[tihe Rules do not...
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to prevent the opportunity for other, more intrinsically offen-
sive, practices from arising.3 Like most prophylactic measures,
the proscriptions in question tend to be overbroad, because in
many cases these intrinsically offensive practices will not actu-
ally result.4 Sometimes, in fact, the prohibited activity might
even give rise to desirable consequences. 5
exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for
no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The
Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
Every state but California adopted the Model Code, or some variation of it.
See NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1980) (noting state variations). The Model
Rules, sometimes with significant deviations, now have replaced the Model
Code in slightly more than one-half of the states. See [4 Current Reports] Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 77 (Mar. 16, 1988); see also C. WOLFRAM,
supra, § 2.6.3, at 56 (discussing authoritative effect of adoption).
3. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-103(A) ("A lawyer shall not
acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litiga-
tion he is conducting for a client ... ."); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule
1.8(j) (containing substantially same language); see also CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS Canon 10 (adopted 1908, superseded by Model Code 1970) [here-
inafter 1908 CANONS] (prohibiting acquiring interest in litigation). The Model
Code explains:
[The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judg-
ment by a lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation generally
makes it undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest
in the cause of his client or otherwise to become financially interested
in the outcome of the litigation.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-7 (emphasis added); see also Part III(B), in-
fra (discussing acquiring interest in litigation).
For examples of other regulations that appear to be primarily preventive
in nature, see MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-101(B) (prohibiting lawyer
from acting as advocate in case in which he should be called as witness);
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 3.7(a) (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 2,
DR 7-104(A)(1) (forbidding communications with parties known to be repre-
sented by counsel); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 4.2 (same); MODEL
CODE, supra note 2, DR 3-102(A) (prohibiting sharing of legal fees with
nonlawyers); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 5.4(a) (same); MODEL CODE,
supra note 2, DR 2-107(A) (regulating division of fees among lawyers); MODEL
RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(e) (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 3-
103(A) (forbidding partnerships with nonlawyers when partnership's activities
include practice of law); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 5.4(b) (same);
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 9-101(B) (prohibiting private employment in
matter on which attorney functioned as public employee); MODEL RULES,
supra note 2, Rule 1.11(a)-(b) (regulating private employment in matter on
which attorney functioned as public employee).
4. In other words, it is not a foregone conclusion that a possibility such
as that referred to in EC 5-7 always will come to pass. See supra note 3.
5. In fact, EC 5-7 recognizes and attempts to minimize the overbreadth
problem, providing that "[a]lthough a contingent fee arrangement gives a law-
yer a financial interest in the outcome of litigation, a reasonable contingent fee
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Concerns with overbreadth of ethical regulations are par-
ticularly appropriate when those regulations may conflict with
the goals that laws not primarily directed at the conduct of at-
torneys seek to achieve. This Article refers to such laws as
laws of general applicability or generally applicable law.6 In
some circumstances laws of general applicability can directly
limit the enforceability of ethical regulations. For example, ju-
risdictions with stringent rules governing attorney solicitation
found, in the 1960s and early 1970s, that the broad application
of those rules conflicted with the constitutional rights of cer-
tain groups to associate freely and to petition for redress of
grievances.7 In the late 1970s and the 1980s, ethical regulators
have encountered and continue to encounter similar conflicts
between rights to free speech and bans on attorney advertising
and solicitation.8
In other circumstances, however, a conflict between ethical
regulations and laws of general applicability can involve a sacri-
fice in attaining the goals of generally applicable law. The
forms of such conflicts can be various and subtle,9 requiring
specific illustration and explanation.'0
is permissible in civil cases because it may be the only means by which a lay-
man can obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice." MODEL CODE, supra
note 2, EC 5-7 (footnote omitted).
6. As used in this Article, the terms laws of general applicability and
generally applicable law may include both substantive law and aspects of pro-
cedure, such as standing. For examples of possible conflicts with generally ap-
plicable law not necessarily involving preventive regulation, see infra note 10.
7. See Riedmueller, Group Legal Services and the Organized Bar, 10
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 228, 246-54 (1974) (discussing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963), through Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); and United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401
U.S. 576 (1971)); see also Armstrong, Ethical Problems in Connection with the
Delivery of Legal Services, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 336 (1975). A possible suc-
cessor to the line of cases discussed in Riedmueller, supra, is In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978). See also infra text accompanying notes 128-30 (briefly discuss-
ing Primus).
8. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1924-25 (1988)
(solicitation); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647-49
(1985) (advertising); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-07 (1982) (advertising);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-59 (1978) (solicitation);
Primus, 436 U.S. at 431-32 (1978) (solicitation); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (advertising); see also infra notes 123-38 (discussing
Supreme Court response to bans on solicitation).
9. This is not meant to suggest, however, that such problems are limit-
less in number, or that the drafters of existing ethical regulations have not at-
tempted to consider them.
10. Uncomfortable relationships between generally applicable laws and
ethical regulations exist even when the ethical regulation in question is not
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One specific area in which laws of general applicability are
in apparent conflict with ethical regulations is in the instigation
of certain types of shareholder litigation. This Article focuses
on the ethical aspects of litigation brought under the specific
statutory mandate of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").' For purposes of discussion and dif-
primarily preventive. For example, the Model Rules require lawyers to dis-
close to the tribunal the perjury of a client in a criminal case. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 2, Rule 3.3(a)(2) (prohibiting lawyer from knowingly failing
to "disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client"); id. Rule 3.3(a)(4) (prohib-
iting lawyer from offering evidence that lawyer knows to be false and requir-
ing lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures upon learning of falsity of
material evidence already offered). The drafters recognized, however, that
such disclosure arguably infringes the right of the accused to effective assist-
ance of counsel. Thus, the comments to Rule 3.3 provide as follows:
The general rule-that an advocate must disclose the existence of per-jury with respect to a material fact, even that of a client-applies to
defense counsel in criminal cases, as well as in other instances. How-
ever, the definition of the lawyer's ethical duty in such a situation
may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due process and the
right to counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions these provi-
sions have been construed to require that counsel present an accused
as a witness if the accused wishes to testify, even if counsel knows the
testimony will be false. The obligation of the advocate under these
Rules is subordinate to such a constitutional requirement.
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 3.3 comment.
Even when there is no apparent conflict between the two, integration of
generally applicable law and ethical regulation can present substantial diffi-
culty. For instance, in certain circumstances some jurisdictions call for attor-
ney disclosure to third parties of at least nonprivileged information indicating
client fraud in the course of representation. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2,
DR 7-102(B)(1); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 4.1(b). The comment to
Rule 4.1 notes that "substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain
information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or
fraud." MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 4.1 comment; see also ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (interpreting
fraud as active fraud, requiring scienter or intent to deceive). These uses ap-
parently contemplate some kind of incorporation by reference of notions of
common law fraud. See generally Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An
Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89, 106 (1977) (discussing the definition of
fraud in the context of the Model Code).
In addition to these examples of conflicts, consider the opportunities for
conflict that the examples of preventive regulations given in note 3, supra,
present.
11. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 896 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982)). Sec-
ton 16(b) provides as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him
from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any
period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in
[Vol. 73:425
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ferentiation, this Article compares these ethical considerations
to similar considerations arising in connection with shareholder
derivative litigation at common law.12
Part I presents a brief overview of the procedural frame-
work for bringing section 16(b) and common-law derivative ac-
tions and discusses the policy objectives behind these actions.
Part II examines two traditional ethical concerns-solicitation
and acquiring an interest in litigation-that may conflict with
implementation of these policy objectives.
The relationship between generally applicable law and eth-
ical regulation in the context of the two types of actions de-
scribed leads to several conclusions, discussed in Part III, most
of which also apply to other ethical regulations that are preven-
tive in nature. For example, although there are ethical impro-
prieties regularly associated with the forms of litigation that
this Article examines, there are instances in which the dangers
that the relevant ethical prohibitions purport to address either
do not exist, or can be handled by alternate methods. More-
over, behavior of attorneys that is a technical violation of ethi-
cal regulations can, especially in the section 16(b) context,
actually further the goals of generally applicable law. Among
the possible results of the type of regulatory overbreadth that
the preceding conclusions suggest is a disinclination of ethical
enforcement bodies to investigate or prosecute technical viola-
good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on
the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into
such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repur-
chasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any secur-
ity of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or
shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter- but no such suit
shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transac-
tion where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved,
or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and
regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of
this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
12. The reference to instigation of shareholder derivative litigation at
common law is a deliberate generalization adopted for purposes of counter-
poise to section 16(b). See infra note 21 and accompanying text. There is, of
course, substantial statutory regulation of derivative actions brought under
state law. See infra notes 29, 54.
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tions in certain recurring fact situations. In other words, en-
forcement bodies may not consistently enforce overbroad rules.
At present, there is no acknowledged method of integrat-
ing the goals of generally applicable law and those of ethical
regulation. Part IV of this Article suggests such a method. Op-
timally, integration would involve rethinking the way in which
legal services are provided in any particular substantive area.
Failing such a drastic restructuring, bodies responsible for the
adoption or enforcement of ethical rules should apply an ana-
lytic method determining, comparing, and, when necessary,
weighing the often conflicting goals of generally applicable law
and ethical regulation. Despite the ethical scrutiny tradition-
ally given to the tension between attorney and client inter-
ests,13 attorney self-interest can play a positive role in
formulating precise responses to conflicts that this integration
process reveals.
I. BACKGROUND
A. SECTION 16(b)
Section 16(b) provides for disgorgement of all profits re-
sulting from short-swing insider trading that is subject to re-
porting under section 16(a) of the 1934 Act. 14 More specifically,
statutorily-defined insiders, including officers, directors, and
certain holders of substantial amounts of the issuer's securities,
must turn over to the issuer any profit received from the
13. See supra note 3 and infra Part M(B).
14. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 896 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1982)). Section 16(a) provides as follows:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other
than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781
of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such se-
curity, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on a
national securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration
statement filed pursuant to section 781(g) of this title, or within ten
days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a
statement with the Commission (and, if such security is registered on
a national securities exchange, also with the exchange) of the amount
of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial
owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month
thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such
month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security is regis-
tered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the ex-
change), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the
calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred
during such calendar month.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
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purchase and sale or the sale and purchase of specified securi-
ties15 taking place within six months of the opposing transac-
tion.16 Although Congress adopted the provision "[flor the
purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such [insider] by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer,"'17 proof of unfair use is not a prerequisite to
liability.'8
Although the issuer may decide of its own accord to bring a
section 16(b) cause of action,19 the provision also allows a share-
holder to instigate suit if the issuer does not respond in a timely
fashion to the shareholder's demand that the issuer sue for dis-
gorgement.20 Because any recovery as the result of such suit is
for the benefit of the issuer, commentators have described sec-
tion 16(b) as creating a "hybrid type of derivative suit."21 Ac-
15. The securities specified are all equity securities of an issuer having
any equity security registered under § 12 of the 1934 Act (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982)). See supra note 14.
16. For general descriptions of the operation of § 16(b), see 2 L. Loss, SE-
cuRrrIEs REGULATION 1037-44 (2d ed. 1961); Painter, The Evolving Role of Sec-
tion 16(b), 62 MICH. L. REv. 649 (1964). There are a number of complexities in
the application of § 16(b) that are beyond the scope of this Article. For discus-
sion of some of these, see Shreve, Beneficial Ownership of Securities Held by
Family Members, 22 Bus. LAw. 431 (1967) (discussing inclusion of shares held
by family members when determining insider status); Tomlinson, Section
16(b): A Single Analysis of Purchases and Sales-Merging the Objective and
Pragmatic Analyses, 1981 DUKE L.J. 941 (discussing characterization of trans-
actions as purchases or sales); Wagner, Deputization Under Section 16(b): The
Implications of Feder v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 1151
(1969) (discussing theoretical deputy status of corporate directors employed by
other corporations); Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The Pragmatic Approach
to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 221
(1975) (advocating use of pragmatic standard to determine liability); Comment,
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Is a Vice President an
Officer?, 58 NEB. L. REv. 733 (1979) (discussing evolving definition of officer).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
18. See Stock Exchange Practices, Part 15, Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res.
56, and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 6557 (1934) (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, Office of Gen-
eral Counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982); see also supra note 11 (quoting § 78p(b));
5 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 3012 ("Increasingly companies seem to be bringing
their own suits.").
20. Section 16(b) provides that the shareholder may initiate suit if the is-
suer fails or refuses to bring suit within 60 days after request or thereafter
fails diligently to prosecute the suit. See supra note 11. Courts will excuse the
demand requirement if demand would be futile. Grossman v. Young, 72 F.
Supp. 375, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), petition for prohibition and mandamus denied
sub. nom. Young v. Rifkind, 2d Cir., Oct.13, 1947. See infra notes 36, 144.
21. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECunmEs REGULATION § 12.3, at 414 (1985).
Nonetheless, there are a number of distinctions between the § 16(b) cause of
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cordingly, for purposes of this Article, general references to
derivative suits or suits in derivative contexts will include ac-
tions under section 16(b) unless the context indicates
otherwise.
A shareholder instigating litigation under section 16(b)
must be a holder of record at the time of suit22 and throughout
trial.2s Section 16(b) does not require, however, that the insti-
gating shareholder have held any shares at the time of the
short-swing transactions giving rise to the cause of action.24
The instigating shareholder's control over the suit is somewhat
limited; ordinarily, the instigating shareholder cannot dismiss
or compromise the suit without court approval and notice to
the issuer's other security holders.2
action and the "true" derivative action. See infra text accompanying notes 53-
58. The Fifth Circuit has taken the position that the cause of action merely
resembles a derivative action in some respects. See Dottenheim v. Murchison,
227 F.2d 737, 738 (5th Cir. 1955), cert denied, 351 U.S. 919 (1957); see also Smo-
lowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.) (stating that § 16(b) "in ef-
fect creates a derivative right of action"), cert denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943);
Rosenfeld v. Richardson, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
% 91,176 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (noting similarities and differences between § 16(b)
suits and ordinary derivative suits), cert. denied sub nom. Leighton v. One Wil-
liam St. Fund, Inc., 373 U.S. 937 (1963); Henss v. Schneider, 132 F. Supp. 60, 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (describing § 16(b) suits as "derivative in nature"); Arbetman
v. Playford, 83 F. Supp. 335, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (describing § 16(b) suit as de-
rivative suit in nature of equitable action); Pottish v. Divak, 71 F. Supp. 737,
739-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (stating that new cause of action is created resembling
shareholder's derivative action). According to Loss:
[Tihe terminology is of no great moment; for, whether the action is
called derivative, pseudo-derivative or non-derivative, it still owes its
existence to the statute and hence does not fall within the frame of
reference created by courts of equity for derivative actions except to
an extent consistent with the statute.
2 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 1046 n.41.
22. See Murchison, 227 F.2d at 740; Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Benisch v. Cameron, 81 F. Supp.
882, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
23. See Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.
1979); Rothenberg v. United Brands Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,045 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977).
24. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d at 79; Benisch, 81 F. Supp. at 884-85; Pottish, 71
F. Supp. at 739; Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). Sec-
tion 16(b) differs in this regard from other derivative causes of action, which
generally require that the shareholder have owned shares at the time the
wrong complained of occurred. See inkfra note 41 and accompanying text.
25. See Blau v. Allen, 171 F. Supp. 669, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Pottish, 71 F.
Supp. at 739-40. But see Plaskow v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 95 F.R.D. 297, 299
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that hearing and notice not necessary when cost
would substantially deplete settlement recovery representing full statutory
damages).
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In the event an action by a shareholder against an insider
results in some recovery, the shareholder typically will be enti-
tled to reimbursement for reasonable attorneys' fees. 26 In fact,
even when the shareholder does not bring suit, a court may
award attorneys' fees if the shareholder's demands force the
corporation into action it otherwise would have refused to
take.2 7 In either case, the court must approve the amount of
the award and, in doing so, will take into account such consid-
erations as "the fund recovered, the difficulty of the litigation,
the time consumed, and the contribution made."2s
B. OTHER DERIVATIVE SUITS
At common law,2 9 a shareholder's derivative action is "an
equitable action by the corporation as the real party in interest
with a stockholder as a nominal plaintiff representing the cor-
poration."30 As this description suggests, any recovery inures to
the corporation and benefits the nominal plaintiff only through
proportional enhancement of share value. The types of wrongs
that may give rise to a common-law derivative action include
wrongful acts by corporate officers, directors, or majority share-
26. Recovery of attorneys' fees is based on the benefit theory described
note 50, irjfra. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
27. See Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1964)
(en banc); Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 195, 197 (E.D.N.Y.
1947); cf. Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1968) (al-
lowing reimbursement for information leading to corporate recovery when
corporation had done nothing for substantial period of time after suspect
transactions and inactivity was likely to continue). Simply notifying the corpo-
ration that a § 16(b) cause of action exists will not suffice, because courts do
not "want lawyers poring over 16(a) reports as soon as they are made public to
find a cause of action before the corporation does and thereby collect a fee."
Id at 473; see Note, Securities Regulation: Section 16(b) and Attorney's Fees
for Parties Not of Record, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (1964).
28. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading under the Securities Exchange Act,
66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 421 (1953).
29. In some jurisdictions, statutes specifically confer and regulate the
right to sue on behalf of the corporation. See generally 13 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5942-5942.210 (indicat-
ing specific statutory provisions); Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 88-89 (1967) (discussing statutes that ease imposed cost
burdens on plaintiff shareholders); Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966
DUKE L. J. 875, 929 (citing significant statutory provisions).
30. Barrett v. Southern Conn. Gas Co., 172 Conn. 362, 370, 374 A.2d 1051,
1055 (1977) (citing 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 29, § 5939); see also Comment,
Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1962) (discussing "blurred area" between direct share-
holder suits and shareholder derivative suits).
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holders,31 and wrongful acts by third parties.32 Shareholders
may not base derivative actions on acts within the discretion of
the corporate officers or directors unless such discretion has
been abused.33
Because the decision to bring suits to redress corporate in-
juries is properly within the discretion of the corporate direc-
tors,34 common law requires a shareholder wishing to sue
derivatively first to demand that the corporation bring the
suit,35 unless it is clear that demand would be futile.36 The de-
cision of the directors not to sue will be conclusive if it is con-
sidered37 and is free of the taint of self-interest. 38 The same
generally is true of a decision by the board, or an independent
committee thereof, to move for dismissal after a shareholder in-
stitutes suit.3
9
31. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 319
(1936); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1882); see also H. HENN & J. AL-
EXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRiSES § 358, at
1037 (3d ed. 1983) (recognizing greater need for derivative remedy when insid-
ers perpetrate wrong).
32. See, e.g., Nelson v. Gammon, 478 F. Supp. 630, 632 (W.D. Ky. 1979),
aff'd, 647 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1981); Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d
401, 403 (Ky. 1963).
33. See, e.g., Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); James Talcott, Inc. v. McDowell, 148 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
34. See Post v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 200 F. 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1912); S.
Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New Eng. Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass.
99, 114, 93 N.E.2d 241, 249 (1950).
35. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw § 15.2, at 640 (1986) ("The procedural
codes of virtually all jurisdictions assume the demand requirement without di-
rectly stating it."); see generally Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders
as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 746-49 (1960) (ex-
plaining rationale for demand requirement).
36. See, e.g., Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88
(2d Cir. 1955); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Continental
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 19, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912). Courts determine
futility in light of the involvement of the directors or those controlling them
in the wrong of which the shareholder complains. Typically, demand will be
regarded as futile when a majority of the board is involved in, or controlled by
those involved in, the alleged wrongdoing. The shareholder may need to
demonstrate the existence of control with some particularity. See Aronson,
473 A.2d at 818-19.
37. See Ash v. I.B.M., 353 F.2d 491, 492-93 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 927 (1966); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 178, 240 P.2d 421, 431
(1952).
38. See Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F. Supp. 973, 976
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 623, 61 A. 1061, 1063
(1905).
39. See Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Lit-
igation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DKE L.J. 959, 964;
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Common law and statutes place various restrictions, in ad-
dition to the demand requirement, on the right of a share-
holder to act as nominal plaintiff.40 One restriction is a
requirement that the complaining shareholder have owned
shares at the time the wrong complained of occurred.4 ' In
some jurisdictions, the complaining shareholder must post se-
curity unless the minimum ownership requirements are met.4
In addition, many jurisdictions require that the shareholder
seeking to bring a derivative suit "fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly sit-
uated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association." 43
Although the standard for representation is not well-devel-
Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death
of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96, 97-98 (1980); Steinberg, The Use
of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits,
35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (1980). Findley appears to have been the first case in
the United States to endorse dismissal at the recommendation of disinterested
directors. Findley, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 178, 240 P.2d at 431.
At least in Delaware, however, a court may exercise its own business judg-
ment in determining whether to dismiss a derivative suit, and whether to re-
view the decision of the directors for disinterestedness and reasonable
diligence. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981). Moreover,
in both Delaware and New York, the question courts address in determining
the appropriateness of dismissal is whether the derivative suit should con-
tinue, rather than whether the shareholder should have brought it in the first
place. Id. at 785; Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
40. The American Law Institute has proposed relaxation of a number of
these restrictions. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRuC-
TURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 7.01-.07 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1982); see also Cox, supra note 39, at 994-1007 (describing and critiquing
proposals).
41. Originally, the ownership requirement was a device "for preventing
the fabrication of diversity of citizenship in federal courts." See Hawes v. Oak-
land, 104 U.S. 450, 451 (1882). State courts now have adopted the requirement
as an indicator of merit. See Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through
Attorneys Fees, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 269, 277; Harbrecht,
The Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25
UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1043, 1048 (1978).
42. About one-third of the states have enacted statutes that require plain-
tiffs in derivative suits to post security for the expenses of defendants in cer-
tain circumstances. See R. CLARK, supra note 35, § 15.5, at 652-53. Some of
these statutes link the requirement to the extent of the plaintiff's sharehold-
ings. Id at 653. See generally Note, Security for Eopenses in Shareholders'De-
rivative Suits: 23 Years'E&perience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 50, 53 (1968)
(discussing statutes that discourage unmeritorious derivative claims). The se-
curity requirement has been of limited effect because courts have allowed
plaintiff shareholders of publicly-held corporations to meet the threshold by
aggregating holdings. I& at 62-63.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572j (1987); OHIo
R. CIv. P. 23.1. Courts may infer such a requirement even when the statute
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oped,44 courts have taken into account such matters as knowl-
edge about the suit,45 intent to vigorously prosecute,46 and
whether the would-be nominal plaintiff is the suit's "moving
force."47
As in the case of the section 16(b) action, a shareholder
who brings a common-law derivative suit may not dismiss or
compromise the suit without court approval.48 The purposes of
this requirement are to guard against settlements dispropor-
tionately benefiting the nominal plaintiff and to discourage
suits intended to spawn such settlements.49 If the suit results
in benefits to the corporation, the nominal plaintiff typically
will be entitled to reimbursement for reasonable expenses, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, in an amount that is subject to court
scrutiny.50 The terms of such scrutiny are similar to those for
does not expressly state it. See, e.g., Youngman v. Tabmoush, 457 A.2d 376, 379
(Del. Ch. 1983).
44. See Note, Res Judicata in the Derivative Actiorn Adequacy of Repre-
sentation and the Inadequate Plaintiff, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1042, 1050 (1973)
[hereinafter Note, Adequacy of Representation]. According to some commen-
tators, the more extensive precedent developed in the context of class actions
applies by analogy. See 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TiCE AND PROCEDURE § 1833, at 132 (1986). But see Note, The Attorney as
Plaintiff and Quasi-Plaintiff in Class and Derivative Actions: Ethical and
Procedural Considerations, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 467, 487-90 (1977)
[hereinafter Note, Attorney as Plaintiff]; Note, Adequacy of Representation,
supra, at 1050.
45. See Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 667 F.2d 958, 961 (11th
Cir. 1982). But see Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982).
46. See Sweet v. Bermingham, 65 F.R.D. 551, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
47. See Davis v. Coined, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 597 (6th Cir. 1980); see also in-
fra text accompanying note 93. In the class action context, see Bogus v. Amer-
ican Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 859, 861 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C.
1973); Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 546 (N.D. IM. 1972). But see
Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 30-31 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (specifying that plaintiffs may dismiss or com-
promise derivative actions only with approval of court and after notice to
shareholders as court directs). A majority of jurisdictions now have similar
rules. See Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-
Part I, 22 Sw. L.J. 767, 767 & n.3 (1968) (citing state statutes).
49. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, § 374, at 1100. Such
suits, typically known as "nuisance suits," may have settlement value without
respect to merit, owing, for instance, to the harassment potential of discovery.
See Conard, supra note 41, at 276.
50. The general American rule is that absent a specific statutory authori-
zation, the prevailing party to a lawsuit cannot recover attorneys' fees. Aly-
eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). There is a
well-established exception, however, providing that a plaintiff in a shareholder
derivative action may recover expenses, including attorneys' fees, from the
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recovery of attorneys' fees in section 16(b) actions,51 and in-
clude assessment of hours worked, regular billing rate, quality
of service, risk of nonrecovery, and extent of benefit to the
corporation.5 2
C. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SECTION 16(b) AND OTHER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
At least one of the differences between instigating section
16(b) litigation and instigating other derivative actions should
be clear: the standing requirements for bringing section 16(b)
litigation are relatively more relaxed, because there is no con-
temporaneous ownership requirement.53 Furthermore, section
16(b) precedent does not require formal scrutiny of the nominal
plaintiff's ability to represent similarly situated shareholders.
corporation on whose behalf action was taken, provided the corporation de-
rives a benefit-monetary or nonmonetary-from the action. See Shlensky v.
Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 149 (3d Cir. 1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d
982, 995 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Note, Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Deriva-
tive Suits: The Substantial Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 164,
164 (1972) (evaluating substantial benefit rule for award of attorneys' fees);
Note, Corporations: Stockholders' Suits: Award of Attorneys' Fees Where Cor-
poration Receives a "Substantial Benefit" 48 CALIF. L. REv. 843, 844 (1960)
(discussing nature of corporate benefits of attorneys' fees).
51. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
52. Presently, the prevailing approach to fee calculation for representative
actions-both class and derivative--brought in federal courts is known as the
"lodestar." Pursuant to this approach, courts base fees on hours worked, mul-
tiplied by an hourly rate (both with checks for reasonableness), adjusted to re-
flect quality of service, risk, and results achieved. See Lindy Bros. Builders,
Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 114-15 (3d
Cir. 1976); see also Herzel & Hagan, Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in Derivative
and Class Actions, 7 LmIGATION 25, 25 (Winter 1981) (discussing problems with
standard calculations of attorneys' fees in derivative and class actions); Mow-
rey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP.
L. 267, 301-02 (1978) (discussing basis and size of attorneys' fees awards);
Rowe, The Supreme Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986 Terms: Eco-
nomics, Ethics and Ex Ante Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 621, 622 (1988)
[hereinafter Rowe, Recent Developments] (discussing recent developments in
the lodestar approach).
Until the late 1970s, awards calculated simply as a percentage of the bene-
fit conferred on the represented corporation were common. See Cole, Counsel
Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions-Hornstein Revisited, 6 U.
RIcH. L. REV. 259, 273-75 (1972); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in
Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 876 (1975); Hornstein, Legal
Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REV.
658, 664 (1956). The movement away from percentages may have been a re-
sponse to antitrust class actions involving estimated benefits in the millions of
dollars. See Hammond, Stringent New Standards for Awards of Attorney's
Fees, 32 Bus. LAw. 523, 524 (1977).
53. See supra notes 24, 41 and accompanying text.
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In a related vein, there is no requirement that a plaintiff post
security, and no restriction on the number or value of shares
the nominal plaintiff must own.
There are, in addition, several distinctions between section
16(b) and other derivative litigation that are not related to the
qualifications of the nominal plaintiff. One distinction, of
course, is that the section 16(b) cause of action is a statutory
creation.m In addition, the elements of a section 16(b) cause of
action are relatively easy to identify and prove. The existence
of other derivative causes of action often is more difficult to
demonstrate, primarily because they usually are based on cir-
cumstances that are more ephemeral and hard to define.55 Fur-
thermore, although section 16(b) and other forms of derivative
litigation generally impose a demand requirement on potential
nominal plaintiffs, the consequences of the issuer's refusal to
instigate suit in its own behalf are critically different. In the
section 16(b) context, the issuer's refusal leaves the nominal
plaintiff free to bring the action. In other derivative situations,
refusal based on a disinterested exercise of reasonable business
judgment56 generally will preclude the suit. Similarly, any at-
tempt by management to have a section 16(b) suit dismissed af-
ter it is brought would be ineffective, but in other derivative
contexts courts will respect management's motion for dismissal
if certain standards are met. Each of these differences5 7 is a
signal that section 16(b) suits are, as a matter of public policy,
favored over other sorts of derivative litigation.58 This Article
discusses the further significance of this conclusion in Part III.
54. A number of states do regulate aspects of derivative suits by statute.
See sup'ra note 29. Nonetheless, the existence of the derivative action substan-
tially predated statutory regulation. See Boyd v. Bell, 64 F. Supp. 22, 23
(S.D.N.Y. 1945) (noting that right of stockholder to bring derivative action is
not creature of statute and existed independently of any statute for many
years); Bourne v. Williams, 633 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (noting
that derivative actions were recognized in state as early as 1874, but statute
was not adopted until 1968); see also Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative
Suit- Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 986 (1957) (crediting
Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) with "paternity of the
shareholders' derivative action").
55. See infra notes 227-45 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
57. See, however, the proposals of the American Law Institute, supra
note 40, for a prospective reconciliation of some of these differences.
58. A cause of action's existence expresses a minimal social judgment on
its desirability. The ease or difficulty of proving a cause of action may express
a qualification of the social judgment. When plaintiffs overcome any difficul-
ties and achieve recovery, however, the recovery presumptively establishes de-
sirability of the action in the particular case.
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II. ETHICAL IMPROPRIETIES PRESENTED BY
SECTION 16(b) AND OTHER DERIVATIVE
LEGAL PRACTICE
A. SECTION 16(b)
It is no secret 59 that a small segment of the bar makes a
practice of identifying potential claims for the recovery of
profit under section 16(b).60 The willingness of courts to award
fees from the amount recovered 6' and the cause of action's rela-
tive ease of proof encourage this pursuit. The lawyers in ques-
tion may solicit shareholders of the traded stock for
employment in bringing suit. Alternatively, these lawyers may
take advantage of section 16(b)'s relaxed standing require-
ments62 by asking acquaintances to purchase the necessary se-
curities and to retain their legal services, 6 3 or by acquiring the
securities themselves.64
There is reason to believe that much, if not most, share-
holder section 16(b) litigation results from the activities just de-
scribed. Because a recovery under section 16(b) redounds to
the benefit of the issuer of the traded securities, an individual
59. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 1052-53 (& Supp. vol. 5, at 3016-17);
Cary, Israels & Loss, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 856, 858-59, 862 (1963); Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REV.
857, 860-61 (1962) (reviewing L. Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULATION (2d ed. 1961)).
60. A review of the reports filed pursuant to the requirements of § 16(a)
reveals potential claims. See supra note 14. In addition, the federal proxy
rules require disclosure in the proxy statement of the indebtedness to the is-
suer-including § 16(b) liability--of officers and directors if such indebtedness
exceeds $60,000. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1988) (incorporating by reference
17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c)); see also Davis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 549, 552-53
(1951) (requiring corporation to disclose indebtedness of director in proxy
statement).
61. See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). There generally is no fee award against
defendants. Courts have held that attorneys' fees are not available under
§ 16(b) when the corporation brings the action. See Super Stores, Inc. v. Rei-
ner, 737 F.2d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 1984).
62. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
63. For example, an attorney responsible for a significant amount of
§ 16(b) shareholder litigation brought in the 1960s represented to the relevant
courts that various individuals had retained him for the purpose of identifying
§ 16(b) causes of action. See Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 470-71
(2d Cir. 1968). The attorney did not discuss whether he or the clients initiated
these arrangements, but the clients would have little incentive to do so. See
id at 470; infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
64. It is not clear which of these three practices is the prevailing one. The
flagrancy of the third, however, renders it the least likely, especially insofar as
it might affect the court's generosity in calculating fees.
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shareholder frequently will have insufficient motivation to seek
out and identify the cause of action, much less to bring suit.65
This reluctance to engage in an activity, resulting because the
participant must share its benefits, is known as the free-rider
problem.66 In circumstances presenting this problem, it often
will be only an attorney-hoping for an award of fees67 at least
roughly proportional to the effort exerted and risk undertaken
to produce the ultimate recovery-who will have adequate in-
centive to pursue possible causes of action.
Another aspect of the free-rider problem in the section
16(b) context is that potential nominal plaintiffs may be unwill-
ing to enter into financial arrangements that require them to
bear the attorneys' fees and expenses of the suit. Because re-
covery is for the benefit of the "wronged" corporation, a section
16(b) suit is economic for most holders of securities 68 only if
brought on a contingent fee basis.69 Moreover, even when the
65. This lack of shareholder motivation is present, of course, in any deriv-
ative suit. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33 and infra text accompany-
ing note 91. In addition, in both § 16(b) and other derivative contexts the
prospect of obtaining an individual benefit by extracting a collateral payment,
possibly in lieu of filing suit, may provide individual shareholders with differ-
ent incentives from those described in the text. In such cases, no free-rider
problem exists, although there are other problems, and it is possible that the
transaction involves neither solicitation nor a contingent fee and expense ar-
rangement. Suits and threatened suits of this nature are outside the scope of
this Article.
66. See generally C. GoETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOM-
ICs, 27-28, 98 (1984) (describing free-rider problem).
67. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
68. This is not the case, however, when the holder is the attorney bringing
suit. See supra text accompanying note 64.
69. In an effort to deal with similar problems in other contexts, many
courts and legislatures have authorized fee shifting on a "private attorney gen-
eral" theory. See Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662-63 [hereinafter Rowe, Fee Shifting]. The
Supreme Court, however, has refused to allow federal courts to shift fees
under this theory without an authorizing statute. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975). One might expect a legislative
response allowing for fee shifting;, however, § 16(b) does not require a finding
of "fault" before imposing liability and there may be instances in which a le-
gitimate need for liquidity requires a short-swing sale. Thus, the general rule
for stripping insiders of short-swing profit alone may provide appropriate de-
terrence of use of inside information. Deterrence of the transactions them-
selves through imposition of the plaintiff's attorneys' fees might be
unnecessarily harsh. In addition, introducing fee shifting, even when "fault" is
involved, may be an unnecessary complication in what is presently a rather
streamlined cause of action.
Fee shifting also would present another set of difficulties. For instance,
allowing a contingency premium when courts shift fees would become prob-
lematic, because the cases in which the risk of plaintiff's loss is greatest are
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fee arrangement is a contingent one, such a suit would be unec-
onomic, from the shareholder's viewpoint, if the shareholder
must advance the expenses of the action or ultimately bear
those expenses in the event of loss. Accordingly, arrangements
pursuant to which an attorney undertakes the suit on a contin-
gent fee basis, and advances all expenses on the same basis, are
virtually an essential concomitant of section 16(b) enforce-
ment.70 This Article will refer to such arrangements as contin-
gent fee and expense arrangements.71
The activities and arrangements described in the preceding
paragraphs give rise to a number of technical violations of
traditional ethical restraints. The solicitation of employment
from existing holders of securities, for example, violates long-
standing proscriptions. 72 Although ethical regulations cur-
also those in which the defendant's case is strongest. Awarding the highest
fees against the defendants with the best cases is arguably illogical and inequi-
table. See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90
YALE L.J. 473, 474, 488-90 (1981).
70. Cf. Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B): Champerty and
Class Actions, 36 Bus. LAw. 1667, 1669-70 (1981) (declaring that derivative ac-
tions almost always violate Model Code's prohibition against acquiring interest
in litigation).
71. When defined in this way, fees and expenses are contingent on the
fact of recovery, but are not necessarily calculated as set percentages of the
recovered amount. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
72. See 1908 CANONS, supra note 3, Canon 28. Canon 28 provided as
follows:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable
to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform
thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or
to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal inju-
ries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure
them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or
to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence
the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen,
court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attachis or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice,
in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or
others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to
the profession devolves upon every member of the Bar having knowl-
edge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately
to inform thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Id.
The later ethical promulgations of the ABA also have imposed limitations
on solicitation. DR 2-103(A) reads as follows: "A lawyer shall not, except as
authorized in DR 2 101(B) [relating to permitted forms of advertising], recom-
mend employment as a private practioner, of himself, his partner, or associate
to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a law-
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rently exempt from some proscriptions the solicitation of em-
ployment from a friend, relative, or client,73 it is doubtful that
the activity of convincing a friend or relative to "buy into" a
cause of action is within the spirit of these exceptions.7 4 In ad-
dition, when the lawyer purchases the securities for the pur-
pose of personally acquiring standing, the lawyer arguably
commits the violation of acquiring an interest in a cause of
action.75
yer." MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 2-103(A) (footnotes omitted). Additional
parts of DR 2-103 preclude requesting others to recommend, or compensating
them for recommending, the lawyer's employment, except in carefully defined
circumstances. Hd DR 2-103(B)-(D).
73. DR 2-104(A) states that:
A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson
that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept em-
ployment resulting from that advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative,
former client (if the advice is germane to the former employment),
or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 2-104(A) (footnotes omitted).
Subsections 2 through 5 of DR 2-104(A) identify four other limited excep-
tions to the general rule against in-person solicitation. Id.
Model Rule 7.3 provides:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective
client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional rela-
tionship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive
for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term
"solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by let-
ter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific
recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circu-
lars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services
of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are
so situated that they might in general find such services useful.
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 7.3. Thus, there is no exception provided for
solicitation of close friends.
See also Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1181-82 & n.6 (1972) (reviewing
historical regulation of solicitation).
The constitutionality of restrictions on solicitation should be considered
in light of the discussion in notes 123-138, infra. Some jurisdictions have
amended their antisolicitation provisions because of constitutional concerns.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImILrY DR 2-103 (1988) (in-per-
son solicitation banned only if it involves solicitation in or around courthouse,
if it involves false or misleading claims or undue influence, if prospective cli-
ent's mental or physical condition makes it unlikely that client can exercise
considered judgment, or if prospective client has expressed wish not to be
solicited).
74. Presumably, the exceptions recognize that a lawyer feels some com-
pulsion by reason of the excepted relationship to advise familiar parties of ex-
isting claims, and that it is likely that the parties would prefer that the lawyer
in question represent them.
75. DR 5-103(A) provides:
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Moreover, regardless of the identity of the nominal plain-
tiff, some forms of financial support that the attorney gives to
the suit may be problematic. Thus, although ethical regulations
now generally permit contingent fee arrangements in civil con-
texts,76 such regulations do not approve so generally the ad-
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action
or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that
he may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses.
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil
case.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-103(A) (footnotes omitted). Model Rule
1.8(j) is virtually identical. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.8(j).
The text suggests, as a literal matter, that the issuer to whom the benefit
of recovery would inure is the client. If one does regard the issuer as the cli-
ent, and if the issuer has declined to pursue its cause of action under § 16(b), it
is arguable that the lawyer's activities constitute the acquisition of an interest
in litigation adverse to that of a client. DR 5-101(A) and MR 1.7(b) generally
preclude such acquisitions. But cf. infra text accompanying note 145 (ques-
tioning the importance of any interest on the part of the issuer in refusing to
pursue the action).
76. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-103(A)(2); MODEL RULES, supra
note 2, Rule MR 1.8(j)(2). Rule 1.5(c) further provides:
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered, except in a matter for which a contingent fee is
prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement
shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to
be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall ac-
crue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation
and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether
such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is
calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer
shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome
of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to
the client and the method of its determination.
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(c). See also MODEL CODE, supra note 2,
DR 2-106(C) (prohibiting contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases);
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(d) (prohibiting contingent fee arrange-
ments in criminal and domestic cases).
EC 2-20 more broadly provides:
Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on
a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee,
it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer, where justified by the par-
ticular circumstances of a case, to enter into a contingent fee contract
in a civil case with any client who, after being fully informed of all
relevant factors, desires that arrangement.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 2-20. Although the contingent fee received a
qualified endorsement in the Canons of Professional Ethics, see 1908 CANONS
supra note 3, Canon 13 (stating "a contract for a contingent fee ... should al-
ways be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness"), even
this unenthusiastic recognition represented a break with the traditional dis-
taste exhibited for the device by the court and bar. See generally Note, Con-
tingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Controls, and Enforceability, 47 IOwA L. REV.
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vancement of expenses on a contingent basis.77 In fact, in many
jurisdictions ethical regulations clearly preclude such an
advancement.78
Finally, in addition to the specific violations just outlined,
there is the possibility that some or all of the attorney's de-
scribed activities and arrangements 79 will present an appear-
ance of impropriety. In some jurisdictions, ethical regulations
define such an appearance itself as grounds for ethical con-
cern. 0 Nevertheless, one of the proper analytic requisites for
an appearance of impropriety to constitute grounds for disci-
pline8 l appears to be a reasonable probability that the attorney
942, 943 (1962) (reviewing commentators' criticisms of contingent fee
arrangements).
77. DR 5-103(B) provides:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pend-
ing litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assist-
ance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the
expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation,
expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and present-
ing evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such
expenses.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-103(B) (footnote omitted). By contrast, Rule
1.8(e) specifies:
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connec-
tion with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.8(e).
78. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-103(B).
79. Possibilities for specific conflicts of interest, breach of client confi-
dence, and similar problems arising later in the course of representation are
beyond the scope of this Article, except as specifically alluded to in notes 182-
87, 200, infra, and accompanying text.
80. Canon 9 of the Model Code states: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the
Appearance of Professional Impropriety." MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Canon
9. There is no parallel provision in the Model Rules. Cf. MODEL RULES, supra
note 2, Rule 1.10 comment, % 9 (calling appearance of impropriety "question-
begging").
81. In fact, the appearance of impropriety seems to be most frequently in-
voked as grounds for disqualification from representation of a particular cli-
ent, rather than as the basis for discipline by any ethical enforcement body.
See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1341, 1349 (5th
Cir. 1981); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Anti-
trust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding no appearance of impro-
priety), cert denied sub nom. California v. Standard Oil Co., 455 U.S. 990
(1982); see also Note, Disqualification of Counsel for the Appearance of Profes-
sional Impropriety, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 343, 345 (1976) (reviewing Second Cir-
cuit's decisions); Note, Appearance of Impropriety as the Sole Ground for
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has committed a more specific ethical violation.8 2 Conse-
quently, this Article will not consider appearance of impropri-
ety separately from the ethical concerns previously
mentioned.8 3
Appearance of impropriety aside, then, the major ethical
concerns suggested by the described activities and arrange-
ments involve either solicitation84 or acquiring an interest in
litigation.85 Although the existence of these violations and the
incentives for attorneys to engage in them are well-nigh irrefu-
table, there has been a marked lack of interest in addressing
these matters from either a theoretical or disciplinary perspec-
tive. Professor Louis Loss was sufficiently discomfited by the
ethical irregularities encouraged by section 16(b) to suggest that
enforcement power be given to the Securities and Exchange
Commission rather than to private parties.8 6 Virtually all
Disqualifwation, 31 U. MLIAm L. REv. 1516, 1521 (1977) (examining Fifth Cir-
cuit's two-pronged test for impropriety).
82. Some courts purport to base disqualification solely on Canon 9. See,
e.g., Pantry Pride, Inc. v. Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg & Casey
(In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litig.), 697 F.2d 524, 530 (3d Cir. 1982); In re
Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d at 1360; Renshaw v. Ravert, 460 F.
Supp. 1089, 1092-93 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Other courts appear to consider the ap-
pearance of impropriety only as a factor. See, e.g., Kessenich v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 684 F.2d 88, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Woods v. Covington
County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1976). Still other courts specifically
describe the appearance to be avoided in terms of some other rule. See, e.g.,
Norton v. Tallahassee Memorial Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 942 (11th Cir. 1982) (pre-
ferring state bar disciplinary machinery to Canon 9); Richardson v. Hamilton
Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384-85 (3d Cir. 1972) (applying Canon 4 of the
Model Code), cerL denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). Finally, other courts simply
have rejected Canon 9 as being unhelpful in most circumstances. See, e.g.,
Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1977) (rejecting
Canon 9 because it depends on eye of beholder), cert. denied 436 U.S. 905
(1978); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
753 (2d Cir. 1975); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 7.1.4 (reviewing criti-
cisms of Canon 9 in disqualification cases); Kramer, The Appearance of Impro-
priety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to
Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 243, 251 (1980) (stating Canon 9 is unnecessary
when Canons 4 and 5 apply); Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification:
The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996, 1000 (1979) (dis-
cussing theories and policies underlying vicarious disqualification).
83. This Article will, however, raise the appearance of impropriety issue
when relevant to other, more specific violations. See infra notes 119-22, 136-37
and accompanying text.
84. See generally Part IH(A), infra.
85. See generally Part HI(B), infra.
86. 2 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 1053-54; see also infra notes 258-59 and ac-
companying text (discussing Loss's recommendation); cf. H. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETMIcs 64 (1953) (removing temptation to solicit those injured in accidents by
making recovery automatic).
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others considering the question, however, seem to have con-
cluded that the ends of section 16(b) enforcement justify means
that may involve technical ethical improprieties. Courts, for in-
stance, uniformly have held that an attorney's solicitational
acts or provision of illicit financial support may be grounds for
disciplinary action, but do not constitute defenses against a sec-
tion 16(b) cause of action s7 In fact, courts considering the issue
have noted that attorneys' fees may be the only incentive for
anyone other than the issuer to bring a section 16(b) suit, and
have directed that awards of such fees "not be too niggardly."88
It is somewhat puzzling that disciplinary bodies have failed
to respond to the courts' statements that certain aspects of sec-
tion 16(b) enforcement may constitute grounds for disciplinary
action. The view that, in these circumstances, the ends justify
the means8 9 would be somewhat more satisfying if the discipli-
nary bodies themselves articulated it. Presumably, any action
by disciplinary bodies in this regard would involve discussion of
both the type and degree of deviation from accepted behavioral
standards tolerable in any given situation.90 Parts III and IV of
87. See, e.g., Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1968);
Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 351
U.S. 972 (1956); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). In the Magida case, the district court subsequently
awarding a fee in the action commented that Congress evidently "regards pub-
lic policy against proved and repeated violations of fiduciary responsibility by
corporate officers at the expense of the public more detrimental to public good
than the violation of generally accepted ethics by attorneys." Magida v. Conti-
nental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Apparently, no one
raised the question whether proof of solicitation would justify disqualification
of the attorney in question in these cases. Solicitation in the context of class
actions has had consequences for the class suit itself, including occasional re-
fusal to certify the class. See Note, Developments in the Law--Cass Actions,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1580 (1976); see also id, at 1586 n.30 (suggesting that
solicitation should be dealt with in separate disciplinary proceedings to avoid
use of delaying tactics and harassment by defendants); infra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text (discussing refusal to certify when representative is too
closely affiliated with attorney).
88. Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 241; see Rayette-Faberge, 389 F.2d at 472; Gilson v.
Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 331
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964) (en banc). For a discussion of the relation between the
actual amounts of such fees and the amount of recovery, see 2 L. Loss, supra
note 16, at 1052 nn.70-72 (& Supp. vol. 5, at 3016-17); Cook & Feldman, supra
note 28, at 421-22 nn.142-43.
89. An alternate and perhaps more practical explanation would be that
the goals of § 16(b) excuse the choice to allocate scarce enforcement resources
elsewhere.
90. For example, one type of deviation from a general standard that disci-
plinary bodies have addressed carefully and ultimately excused, apparently on
public policy grounds, is disclosure of client confidences for the purpose of
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this Article provide a suggested analysis along these lines.
B. INSTIGATION OF OTHER FORMS OF DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
The free-rider problem and the usual availability of attor-
neys' fees out of any benefit provided to the corporation 91 cause
the activities and incentives of attorneys in other derivative
contexts to parallel those present in section 16(b) contexts. A
few differences, however, make problems with ethical impro-
prieties in contexts other than those involving section 16(b)
more extreme.
One distinction involves solicitation. In the nonsection
16(b) derivative context, because of the strict standing require-
ments discussed above, including the requirement that the
nominal plaintiff have owned securities at the time the cause of
action arose, the attorney will presumably solicit only those
shareholders who held securities at the appropriate time and
who continue to so hold. These individuals are unlikely to be
the soliciting attorney's pre-existing clients, relatives, or
friends, and therefore are unlikely to come within any excep-
tion to the solicitational ban.92
Moreover, even if an attorney generally could contact a
prior acquaintance in connection with the bringing of a deriva-
tive suit, using an acquaintance as the nominal plaintiff
presents difficulties. In some cases, courts have declined to
confirm a potential nominal plaintiff's standing on the grounds
that he or she is too closely affiliated with the attorney bring-
ing suit and thus is not the "moving force" behind the action.93
preventing crime. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101(C)(3) (allowing
lawyer to reveal intention of his client to commit crime and information neces-
sary to prevent crime); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (allowing
lawyer to reveal information reasonably believed necessary to prevent client
from committing criminal act believed likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm). The exception contained in Rule 1.6(b)(1) represents
careful tailoring by the drafters, albeit with a result that many might criticize.
See Subin, War over Client Confidentiality: In Defense of the Kutak Ap-
proach, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 19, 1981, at 22, col. 1 (noting confusion caused by excep-
tion due to lack of guidance for attorneys); Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure, 1983:
Hearings on S. 485 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposing to criminalize
lawyer's nondisclosure of client fraud in some circumstances).
91. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
92. Although an attorney might monitor possible causes of action related
to securities that the attorney, or a client, relative, or friend, owns, it is some-
what unlikely that any attorney specializing in derivative lawsuits consistently
would be able to rely on employment from these sources.
93. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Note, Attorney as
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Paradoxically, an attorney's solicitation of a stranger as nomi-
nal plaintiff could create similar doubts as to the plaintiff's in-
terest in pursuing the action.9 4 By contrast, as noted above,
courts specifically have refused to regard solicitation as a bar to
section 16(b) suits.95 At a minimum, this suggests that attor-
neys soliciting derivative suits not based on section 16(b) have a
relatively greater incentive to be discreet.
Another distinction between attorney activities in the sec-
tion 16(b) area and those in other derivative contexts involves
the relative difficulties of suit. Because proof of a common-law
derivative claim tends to be more complex 96 and there is some
possibility that the board of directors may thwart the action,97
the risk of loss is greater than in the case of section 16(b) litiga-
tion. As a result, it is even more likely that the nominal plain-
tiff in a non-16(b) action will ask an attorney to undertake the
action on a contingent fee basis and, similarly, to advance the
expenses of the suit with repayment contingent on the litiga-
tion's outcome.98
Plaintif, supra note 44, at 488 n.113 (noting court decisions disallowing deriv-
ative lawsuits when plaintiff was close business associate of attorney and when
plaintiff was attorney's partner at law).
94. See Note, Attorney as Plaintiff, supra note 44, at 487. In the class ac-
tion context, some courts have considered solicitation as an impediment to
class certification. See Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237, 240
(N.D. Tex. 1972); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fermer & Smith, Inc., 16
Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1021, 1022 (N.D. Tex. 1972). But cf. Bill Minielli
Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381, 390-91 (S.D.
Ohio 1973) (holding that conversation between attorney and plaintiff was not
solicitation). One should evaluate the constitutionality of solicitation-related
limitations in light of NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (recognizing that
first and fourteenth amendments protect attorney's speech from state prohibi-
tions) and the subsequent cases referred to in note 7, supra, and in light of the
line of cases discussed at notes 123-38, infra.
95. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
96. See supra text accompanying note 55 and infra notes 227-45 and ac-
companying text.
97. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
98. Here, the possible interaction of generally applicable law and ethical
constraints is similar to that referred to in note 94, supra. Because of the long-
standing technical inability of attorneys to advance expenses on a contingent
basis, see generally Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48,
69-78 (1935) (discussing historical problems with compensating attorneys on
contingent fee basis), some courts may require that the proposed nominal
plaintiff be able to bear such expenses before confirming standing. See, e.g.,
Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 634, 635 (W.D. Pa. 1973);
Korn v. Franchard Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972). But see Sanderson
v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied sub
nor Nissan Motor Corp. v. Sanderson, 421 U.S. 914 (1975); Brame v. Ray Bills
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III. THE ETHICAL REGULATIONS AND THE
PROBLEMS THEY ARE MEANT TO ADDRESS
In considering why disciplinary action did not obliterate
long ago the technical ethical violations described in Part II, it
is necessary to examine the origin and purpose of each of the
rules violated. Among other consequences, this examination
sheds light on possible rule alterations that could specifically
address the evils, if any, that technical violations committed in
the instigation of derivative litigation present. It also suggests
differences in rules that might apply depending on the particu-
lar type of action involved.99
A. SOLICITATION
1. In General
As an initial matter, it is necessary to recognize that solici-
tation of employment is not per se immoral. It is neither an
activity unequivocally condemned by religious or philosophi-
cal thinkers °° nor one to which the average person would re-
Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568, 576-79 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 384-86 (E.D. Pa. 1974), modified, 69
F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See generally Annotation, Effect of Breach of Eth-
ics or Other Misconduct by Plaintiffs' Attorney on Status of Class Action
Under Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.L.R. Fed. 883 (1973).
Thus, although it has been acknowledged that attorneys often advance ex-
penses and have an under-the-table agreement with the nominal plaintiff to
forgive payment in the event of loss, the financial inability of a plaintiff to pay
such expenses may preclude prosecution of the suit. See Findlater, supra note
70, at 1669, 1671 n.27; Note, Class Certification: Relevance of Plaintiff's Fi-
nances and Fee Arrangements with Counsel, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 70, 91 (1978).
This issue logically arises in terms of whether the nominal plaintiff adequately
can represent the interests of similarly situated shareholders. See supra notes
43-47 and accompanying text.
99. The examination does not, however, attempt to resolve the desirability
of existing rules in the abstract or in any non-derivative context. It is a thesis
of this Article that contextual variation is a critical consideration in determin-
ing the interaction of ethical regulations and generally applicable law. See in-
fra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
100. It is, of course, difficult to demonstrate absence of condemnation. By
process of reason, however, this demonstration is possible with respect to at
least two major types of philosophies. First, some philosophies, often de-
scribed as "teleological," regard the outcome of conduct as the determinant of
its moral rightness or wrongness. See Smart, An Outline of a System of Utili-
tarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 30-42 (1973). From this
standpoint, the morality of any act of solicitation presumably would depend on
its relevant impact on the actor and all other parties. Thus, teleological theo-
rists would approve or condemn an act of solicitation not in the abstract, but
depending on whether it represented a net improvement in general welfare.
Another set of philosophical theories, termed "deontological," assesses the mo-
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act 1° ' in the same way as, say, to unprovoked murder, child
abuse, or rape.10 2 Moreover, it is possible to identify many situ-
ations in which solicitation could accomplish social good by, for
instance, encouraging oppressed classes to assert legal rights
otherwise unappreciated or unrealized. 0 3 If ethical regulators
cannot ground restrictions on solicitation on concepts of moral-
ity, however, such restrictions become merely prophylactic, and
it is relevant to identify the true objects of prevention.
Commentators have suggested that the initial antipathy of
the American bar toward solicitation was, in large part, a reac-
tion to the activity of immigrant lawyers. 0 4 Because attempts
are still made to restrict solicitation, 0 5 however, other more ac-
ceptable justifications must coincidentally support the ban.
These appear to be at least six in number. 0 6
To begin with, the ban on solicitation has the effect of en-
rality of conduct by preexisting principles of right and wrong. See R. DWOR-
KiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 150-83 (1977); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 7-
29 (1978). Protection of the autonomy of individuals is one of the principles
that these theories most regularly invoke. See A. DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF
MORALrrY 31 (1977); C. FRIED, supra, at 155-60. Presumably, deontological
thinkers would condemn solicitation involving overreaching, see infra notes
110-14 and accompanying text, or some similar attempt to impose the lawyer's
will on the prospective client. When the act of solicitation simply represented
a means of conveying information, however, it should, at worst, be value-
neutral.
101. One may aptly characterize a test couched in terms of average reac-
tion as a "noncognitive" test of morality. See Hart, Positivism and the Separa-
tion of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 624-27 (1958).
102. The statement in the text assumes that the actor would not undertake
murder, abuse, or rape for any even arguably "moral" purpose, such as bring-
ing about a change in law or public perception.
103. The facts of the case of In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), provide an
example of the accomplishment of social good. There, the lawyer had directed
nonpecuniarily motivated solicitational activity toward informing otherwise
unaware welfare recipients of certain rights arising from their illegal steriliza-
tion. Id at 414-17.
Perhaps the possibility of a good effect does no more than place solicita-
tion in the same category as acts that, like courteous falsehoods and killing in
self-defense, continue to be morally troubling. Nonetheless, this possibility
distinguishes solicitation from the class of immoral acts described in the text
accompanying note 102, supra.
104. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 40-41 (1976).
105. See supra notes 72-73 (discussing MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 2-
103(A), DR 2-104(A) and MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 7.3).
106. A possible seventh justification--creation of an opportunity for con-
flict of interest, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 461 n.19
(1978); Primus, 436 U.S. at 426-seems to be no more than a byproduct of the
other dangers discussed; this Article will not deal with it separately.
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suring that some individual or entity has a sufficient interest in
a given right so as affirmatively to seek its vindication. If one
regards lawyers' services and use of the court system as scarce
resources, it may be desirable to allocate those resources to
those who most desire them, as demonstrated not only by their
willingness to agree, in advance, to pay for them, but also by
their efforts at self-identification. Such an allocation could
mean that the adjudication system would function more effi-
ciently10 7 than would be the case when the bringing of litiga-
tion reflected only an estimation by the lawyer of the value of
employment. 0 Accordingly, when lawyers successfully engage
in solicitation, popular opinion condemns them as having
"stirred up" litigation that otherwise presumably would have
remained dormant. 0 9
A second justification advanced for the general prohibition
of solicitation is protection of the solicited party from the risk
of overreaching. 110 The need for protection arguably arises be-
cause a fee-seeking lawyer might convince an otherwise disin-
clined individual to institute an action."' When the solicited
107. Such functioning presumably also would comport with the adjudica-
tion system's traditional peacekeeping function. See Hegland, Beyond Enthusi-
asm and Commitment, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 805, 812 (1971) (stating that wronged
party who is not perturbed enough to seek out lawyer probably will not en-
gage in peace-breaching self-help).
108. When the lawyer has a valid interest in the vindication of the right in
question, this would not be the case. It is arguable that it is a valid attorney
interest-the willingness to bring litigation from which the attorney will not
monetarily profit-that justifies the distinction apparently drawn by the
Supreme Court, see infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text, and the Model
Rules, see supra note 73, between those solicitations from which the attorney
will benefit pecuniarily and those from which the attorney will not so benefit.
In fact, as used by the Supreme Court, lack of pecuniary benefit simply ap-
pears to be an aid in distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech.
In this same regard, however, it is somewhat paradoxical, possible con-
flicts of interest aside, that the attorney bringing suit often is precluded from
serving as the nominal plaintiff in class and derivative actions. See generally
Note, Attorney as Plaintiff, supra note 44, at 473-77.
109. See supra note 72 (discussing 1908 CANONS, supra note 3, Canon 28,
which condemns "stirring up litigation" in strongest terms).
110. Commentators have defined overreaching as "aggressive competition
among lawyers for clients which leads to lawyers approaching clients at times
when the clients are in no condition to properly consider retention of a lawyer,
for example, immediately after an accident." Note, Duty to Make Counsel
Available, supra note 73, at 1184 n.23. This definition appears to collapse both
the danger that solicitation will convince a disinclined individual to sue and
the danger that solicitation will deprive the solicited party of the right freely
to choose a lawyer. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. As used in the
text, the term overreaching refers only to the former.
111. This danger is particularly likely to occur when in-person solicitation
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individual is debilitated"12 or otherwise particularly vulnera-
ble,113 this risk is most intense. The fear of overreaching ap-
pears to be rooted in the aversion to inefficiency addressed
above and in traditional notions of respect for individual
autonomy.'14
The risk of overreaching is closely related to the third risk
arguably posed by solicitation, that of impairing the client's
freedom of choice. Here, instead of overcoming a disinclination
to take action, the soliciting lawyer prevents the client from
freely selecting the attorney whose services the client other-
wise would choose. Presumably, this has the effect of inhib-
iting the exercise of client autonomy, as well as leading to a less
congenial pairing than otherwise would have occurred. This
danger is particularly acute when the client already is aware of
the right to be vindicated1 5 and would engage in some rational
process of attorney selection if left to his or her own devices.
Comparison shopping, or selecting an attorney based on family
or social ties, might result in increased satisfaction. Even if the
client might have selected an attorney simply by looking in the
yellow pages, a limitation of this freedom may lead to lingering
resentment and distrust.
A fourth justification for the organized bar's aversion to so-
licitation, again related to the risk of overreaching, concerns
the individual's right of privacy. 16 The bar argues that if ethi-
permits the soliciting lawyer to exert pressure for an immediate response. See
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978); see also Comment,
Attorney Solicitation.m The Scope of State Regulation After Primus and
Ohralik, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 144, 155 (1978) (emphasizing Supreme Court's
refusal to condone attorney pressure on potential client to make immediate
response).
112. The fact pattern in Ohralik provides a classic illustration. There, the
lawyer subjected to discipline had solicited employment from two teenagers,
one of whom was in traction in the hospital recuperating from injuries suf-
fered in an accident and the other who had been released from the hospital
the day before. Id. at 449-50.
113. The term undue influence frequently is used to refer to "[m]isuse of
position of confidence or taking advantage of a person's weakness, infirmity, or
distress to change improperly that person's actions or decisions." BLACK'S
LAw DIcIoNARY 1370 (5th ed. 1979). This closely resembles the first defini-
tion of overreaching given in note 110 supra, and similarly collapses both of
the dangers described in that note.
114. See supra note 100.
115. If the client is not otherwise aware of this right, solicitation arguably
has the effect of enhancing freedom of choice.
116. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467; see also Comment, supra note 111, at 179-
81 (refuting claim that privacy rights of individuals justify state solicitation
rules).
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cal regulations permitted solicitation, lawyers would perch at
the bedsides of accident victims, linger outside the doors of
quarrelling couples, and engage in similar behavior in a variety
of contexts. Not only would the process of identifying potential
clients offend the sense of privacy of those being scrutinized,
the appearance of a lawyer at a time of stress could disrupt pri-
vate attempts at problem resolution. Moreover, such situations
exacerbate the dangers of overbearing and infringement of
freedom of choice.
Some commentators have suggested that attorneys engaged
in solicitation also are likely to mislead the individuals solicited
about the probability of prevailing, fee arrangements, and re-
lated matters.11 7 At its most basic, this fifth justification seems
to be the equivalent of saying that aggressive lawyers are likely
to be liars, but it is possible to elevate it in light of the opportu-
nity created for misleading. Thus, because solicitation may take
place in a private, one-on-one context, any claims a lawyer
makes will not be subject to public scrutiny.1 " This may ex-
pose gullible individuals to substantial risk and make proof of
misleading statements extremely difficult.
A sixth, and final, objection to solicitation involves the ap-
pearance of impropriety. Traditionally, 119 many members of
the bar have regarded certain solicitational activities as undig-
nified, 2 0 thus detracting from the desired image of profession-
alism.121 To the extent that these activities in fact detract from
public trust and willingness to use lawyers when advisable,
117. See Ohralic, 436 U.S. at 457-58; see also McChesney, Commercial
Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions and
Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 102-12 (1985) (noting that better
methods to constrain deception exist than banning commercial speech).
118. See Perschbacher & Hamilton, Reading Beyond the Labels: Effective
Regulation of Lawyers' Targeted Direct Mail Advertising, 58 U. COLO. L. REv.
255, 261 (1987); Thurman, Direct Maik Advertising or Solicitation? A Distinc-
tion Without a Difference, 11 STETSON L. REV. 403, 407 (1982).
119. Cf. 1908 CANONS, supra note 3, Canon 28, quoted in note 72, supra
(calling "stirring up litigation" "unprofessional").
120. This view does not obviously brook exceptions for nonpecuniarily mo-
tivated solicitations, which might appear to some as not in the least undigni-
fied. See supra note 72; cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 437 n.31 (1978)
(commenting on traditional exception from general bans on solicitation for of-
fers of representation without charge).
121. At the same time that lawyers raise concerns about professional im-
age, however, ethical regulations caution that "[the lawyer's] duty to clients or
to the public should never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of
his obligation may be misunderstood or may tend to subject him or the legal
profession to criticism." MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 9-2. It appears, then,
that whether this edict overrides concern with the appearance of impropriety
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they may also support a public policy argument against
solicitation. 22
2. The Supreme Court Response to Bans on Solicitation
The Supreme Court has considered several of the foregoing
justifications, either in the context of solicitation or in the re-
lated context of attorney advertising.M Typically, the cases
have required the Court to decide whether attempts to regulate
these activities impermissibly trespass on various rights that
the first and fourteenth amendments protect.2 4 In response,
the Court has indicated that advertising and solicitational activ-
ities can have significant constitutional implications. At the
least, nonideological advertising and solicitation, when con-
ducted for pecuniary gain, are protected commercial speech,25
and their regulation is subject to scrutiny for the presence of le-
gitimate state interests.2 6 Regulation may be fairly imprecise,
in the solicitation area reduces to a question of whether there is any arguable
preexisting duty to the client or the public.
122. The argument that solicitation presents an improper appearance that
lawyers should avoid is a possible exception to the observation that regulation
of solicitation is preventive, although the public trust aspect of the argument
does have preventive overtones.
123. In fact, all advertising appears to have elements of solicitation. See
Langan, Professional Responsibility, 1985 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 877, 887 n.63
(discussing distinction that "[n]ot all solicitation is advertising, but all advertis-
ing implicitly or explicitly involves solicitation"). Generally, however, courts
appear to "use 'solicitation' to refer to direct, in-person contact and 'advertise-
ment' as contact via the media." Note, The Expanding Constitutional Protec-
tion of Commercial Speech: Attorney Advertising after Zauderer, 1986 DET.
C.L. REV. 199, 204 n.46; see also Langan, supra, at 887 n.63 (distinguishing ad-
vertising, which "[b]rings information to the attention of the public," from so-
licitation, which "implies a personal petition to a particular person to obtain
employment").
124. These rights generally include various interests in expression, see
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646-47 (1985); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204-07 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 455-59 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 433-38 (1978); Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977), or association, see supra note 7 (citing cases).
125. Commercial speech is speech that simply "propose[s] a commercial
transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). In appropriate circumstances, courts have char-
acterized both attorney advertising, see Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; RMJ., 455
U.S. at 199; Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-64, and solicitation, see Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
454, in this manner.
126. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980), the Supreme Court held that states may regulate commercial
speech only if the state's interest in regulation is substantial, the regulation in
question directly advances the state's interest, and the regulation is not more
extensive than necessary. This analysis has been applied in subsequent law-
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however, and in some circumstances may be based on the po-
tential for harm rather than on its actual occurrencem At the
other end of the spectrum, any regulation of solicitational activ-
ity that is not directed toward pecuniary gain and that it is pos-
sible to characterize as political expression is subject to
exacting scrutiny- 28 Thus, the state must demonstrate a com-
pelling state interest and the existence of actual harm in order
for such regulation to withstand constitutional challenge. 2 9
In the process of sketching the spectrum just described, the
Court has made it clear that genuine dangers of overbearing or
misleading can justify regulation of commercial speech. In this
context, the Court has said:
The State's special interest in regulating members of a profession it
licenses, and who serve as officers of its courts, amply justifies the ap-
plication of narrowly drawn rules to proscribe solicitation that in fact
is misleading, overbearing, or involves other features of deception or
improper influence.... [A] State also may forbid in-person solicita-
tion for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in these
evils 130
This language suggests, of course, that states cannot forbid in-
person solicitation for pecuniary gain in all circumstances. In
dicta in a later case, however, the Court described its prior
holding as providing that a state may "categorically ban" all in-
person solicitation.13' At the same time, the Court held that
states could not categorically ban targeted, direct-mail solicita-
tion, stating that the latter "poses much less risk of overreach-
ing or undue influence" than the former, 32 and constitutes no
yers' advertising cases. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637-38; RMJ., 455 U.S. at 203
n.15. For a general discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, see Canby,
Commercial Speech of Lawyers: The Court's Unsteady Course, 46 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 401, 401-22 (1980); McChesney, supra note 117, at 48-66; Note, Attorney
Advertising--Recent Update, 8 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 505, 509-16 (1983).
127. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-67 (addressing dangers that in-person so-
licitation presents). See, however, the Court's statement in RM.J., 455 U.S. at
203, that "the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of
potentially misleading information . . . if the information also may be
presented in a way that is not deceptive," and in Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644, that
"[w]e need not ... address the theoretical question whether a prophylactic
rule is ever permissible in this area[ presumably that of potentially deceptive
advertising], for we do not believe that the State has presented a convincing
case for its argument that the rule before us is necessary to the achievement of
a substantial governmental interest."
128. See Primus, 436 U.S at 432-33.
129. See id.
130. Id& at 438-39 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
131. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1921 (1988).
132. Id- at 1922.
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more an invasion of privacy than other types of mailings. 133
Although targeted mailings create some risk of deception, the
Court believed this risk to be less than that created by in-per-
son solicitation, and that less drastic means than complete pro-
hibition could adequately address it. 13 Based on this decision,
the Court's list of permissible concerns supporting prophylactic
regulation appears to include, as it has included in prior cases,
"overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influ-
ence, and outright fraud.' 135 It is unclear whether these factors
must appear in combination, although the Court's conclusion
with respect to targeted mail suggests that some combination is
necessary.
In developing the foregoing list of acceptable justifications
for the regulation of attorneys' commercial speech, the Court
has forthrightly disposed of two other arguments. First, in the
advertising context, the Court has scoffed at arguments based
on the appearance of impropriety, noting that the public is al-
ready aware that the practice of law is a business typically con-
ducted for private profit.136 Moreover, the Court has said:
[A]Ithough the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in ensur-
ing that its attorneys behave with dignity and decorum in the court-
room, we are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain
their dignity in their communications with the public is an interest
substantial enough to justify the abridgment of their First Amend-
ment rights. Even if that were the case, we are unpersuaded that un-
dignified behavior would tend to recur so often as to warrant a
prophylactic rule.
1 3 7
Second, on the subject of "stirring up" litigation, the Court has
had this to say:
That our citizens have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be
regretted; rather, it is an attribute of our system of justice in which
we ought to take pride. The State is not entitled to interfere with
that access by denying its citizens accurate information about their
133. Id at 1923.
134. Id.
135. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)
(paraphrasing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978)).
The Court was careful to note, however, that in-person solicitation, the prac-
tice presenting these dangers, posed unique regulatory difficulties because it is
"not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny." Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641
(quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466).
136. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-69 (1977). This holding suggests
that the Supreme Court regards the appearance of impropriety argument as,
at best, a "piggy-back" justification, relevant only where other, more substan-
tial dangers are present. See also supra note 82 (discussing appearance of im-
propriety as factor in disqualification).
137. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647-48.
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legal rights. Accordingly, it is not sufficient justification for... disci-
pline... that... truthful and nondeceptive advertising had a ten-
dency to or did in fact encourage others to file lawsuits.
13 8
Thus, although the appearance of impropriety and the danger
that lawyers will "stir up" litigation might buttress a list of jus-
tifications for preventive regulation containing other more sub-
stantial factors, neither appears to survive as an independent
consideration.
3. Section 16(b) Solicitation
Traditional analysis of the permissibility of solicitation has
done little to acknowledge the possible effects of varying the
type of suit for which the solicitation occurs. For instance,
when the Supreme Court loosely, and unnecessarily, character-
ized a former holding as providing that states could completely
prohibit in-person solicitation, the Court apparently ignored the
possibility that the rationale for such a ban could be context-
specific. The following discussion illustrates the need for more
careful application of the Court's own general guidelines.
Solicitation undertaken in the section 16(b) context pre-
sumably would be subject to no more than reduced scrutiny
under the general analytic spectrum proferred by the Supreme
Court.139 Granting that states could regulate solicitation of sec-
tion 16(b) litigation on the basis of prospective dangers impli-
cating state interests, it becomes appropriate to consider
precisely what dangers exist. This process reveals that section
16(b) causes of action present situations in which the tradi-
tional justifications for antisolicitation regulations generally are
inapplicable.
Interestingly, it is the very circumstances creating the free-
rider problem that suggest that certain of the familiar solicita-
tional dangers may be minimal in the section 16(b) context.
For example, because no individual shareholder is likely to
have adequate incentive to file suit, no such shareholder should
have a substantial interest in maintaining complete freedom in
138. Id at 643.
139. This statement is true despite the existence of a line of cases sug-
gesting that the rights to associate and to petition for redress of grievances
protect collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts. See authorities listed in note 7, supra. Although the derivative nature
of the § 16(b) suit has implications of representative, if not collective, activity,
and even though solicitation may be necessary to give the cause of action
meaning in many situations, the cases referred to all involve the solicitational
activities of nonprofit advocacy organizations.
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choosing a lawyer. Similarly, when any recovery is for the ben-
efit of a corporation and affects each shareholder only through
relatively minimal enhancement of share value, implication of
substantial privacy interests is unlikely; in other words, the
shareholder is not apt to be offended by a stranger's identifica-
tion of the existence of the cause of action. Finally, because of
the attenuated nature of the shareholder's interest in recovery,
circumstances meriting concern with overreaching are almost
totally lacking. There is no reason to think that shareholders
will be overwrought, debilitated, or otherwise incapable of ex-
ercising detached judgment in the section 16(b) context.
It is true, however, that permitting solicitation in connec-
tion with section 16(b) litigation presents a risk that suits will
be brought even though no individual was sufficiently incensed
to seek out a lawyer, and thus that lawyers will "stir up" litiga-
tion. Nonetheless, the statement of the Supreme Court on the
dangers of "stirring up" litigation significantly undercuts the
importance of this event.140 Moreover, it is crucial to recognize
that, in the section 16(b) context, solicitation of individuals
otherwise disinclined to sue will not necessarily lead to any
waste of resources. In fact, there is a sound argument that
waste does not occur.
The first step in this argument is to demonstrate that the
lack of unsolicited plaintiff interest in the section 16(b) suit is
no reflection on its worth. This point is easily made with re-
spect to lack of interest on the part of shareholders; because
the benefit of the action inures to the corporation, individual
shareholders usually lack sufficient interest to initiate suit.141
If the section 16(b) cause of action has reached the stage of at-
torney solicitation of a nominal plaintiff, however, corporate
management'4 thus far also has declined enforcement. None-
theless, even though corporate law charges management with
acting on the corporation's behalf, its assessment does not serve
as an appropriate measure of the value of the section 16(b)
cause of action. This is true for two reasons: the management's
assessment of corporate interests may be inaccurate, and, more
importantly, the corporation's interests may be irrelevant.
140. See supra text accompanying note 138.
141. Shareholders with substantial percentage ownerships in the corpora-
tion might, in fact, be motivated to bring suit, although their motivation will
never be as great as would be that of a 100% owner, or as great as would be
socially desirable, see infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
142. This Article loosely defines corporate management as including the di-
rectors and officers of the entity in question.
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Thus, on the one hand, when section 16(b) trading is in-
volved, bringing suit often would require corporate manage-
ment to accuse one of its own.143 There is good reason to
believe that management is not, in such circumstances, a trust-
worthy repository of the ability to assess the corporation's best
interests,144 and accordingly may not be the appropriate mecha-
nism to deal with the free-rider problem.145 Conversely, there
may be circumstances in which the decision of management not
to bring suit, even against its own, does reflect a good faith and
fully informed determination based on a rational perception of
the corporation's best interests. Congress nonetheless has spec-
ified that, in the section 16(b) context, management's refusal to
bring suit is completely superseded by the contrary decision of
any security holder. A logical extrapolation from this specifica-
tion is the conclusion that management may not seek to dismiss
a section 16(b) suit after it has been filed. Section 16(b) thus
appears to subordinate a specific corporation's best interests to
the goal of deterring insider trading, thereby rendering those
interests largely irrelevant.
There is, of course, more to demonstrating absence of
waste than excusing lack of unsolicited interest. The second
logical step consists of ensuring that suits brought have formal
merit. Ironically, one of the soundest assurances that section
16(b) suits will not be brought frivolously is a logical corollary
of the individual's lack of interest in suing. As discussed above,
most fee arrangements for section 16(b) suits will be contingent
on the suit's success, either through settlement or judgment
and, in any case, will be subject to court scrutiny.146 Use of a
contingent fee arrangement ensures that lawyers themselves
will assess the chance of success before instituting any action.
Formal merit, however, does not necessarily translate into
acknowledged "value" from the standpoint of a potential plain-
tiff. There probably are any number of existing legal rights
143. Even when the suit in question would be against a substantial share-
holder, the implications of management self-interest are clear.
144. Although in other derivative suits courts may excuse the demand re-
quirement where futile, see supzra note 36, the plaintiff must prove an allega-
tion of futility, because "it is not every 'insider' who controls the board of
directors," Netter v. Ashland Paper Mills, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). With respect to theoretical operation of demand requirements, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 160-62.
145. Even when management does institute suit on demand, the identifica-
tion of the circumstances justifying demand present a free-rider obstacle.
146. See supra text at note 28, notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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that the possessor does not deem worthy of enforcement. 147
Although some determinations of this nature are attributable
to the unimportant nature of the right, a more likely deterrent
is the size of enforcement costs. 148 Nevertheless, a solicited suit
that is brought on a contingent fee and expense basis presents
different considerations and calculations than one with costs
that must be paid in all events. 49 This is particularly true
when the emotional costs associated with the suit are inconse-
quential, as is most likely the case when the right involved is of
an impersonal nature. In these circumstances, clients often
may allow lawyers to decide how to allocate their services with-
out reference to any comprehensive analysis by the client of
the relative costs and benefits of the right to be enforced.150
The lawyer may base this decision on such matters as the law-
yer's own enjoyment of a particular kind of litigation, or an as-
sessment that the cause of action is particularly cost-effective
because of ease of proof.
Unfortunately, the potential for waste is not obviously
cured by acknowledging that, in some circumstances, it is the
lawyer and not the client who determines the relative worth of
a lawsuit. Presumably, some factor other than the potential pe-
cuniary benefit to the lawyer should be determinative. One
such factor, when authoritative evidence of public policy exists,
may be the social worth of the litigation.
In the section 16(b) context, demonstration of social worth
is readily forthcoming. Section 16(b) is an explicit, statutorily-
created cause of action consistently favored as a matter of pub-
lic policy. 151 By establishing a relatively easy derivative cause
of action, in which the interests of the represented entity are
secondary or irrelevent, Congress and the courts effectively
have assessed the intrinsic worth of the section 16(b) lawsuit.152
147. These might include, for example, any number of minor trespass or
assault cases.
148. In either case, from an economic standpoint, one could describe such a
determination simply as the possessor's choice to allocate to some other pur-
pose the resources-emotional, monetary, and otherwise-that enforcement
would require.
149. Thus, when the monetary cost of enforcement will be deducted only
from a recovery, a benefit the party-in-interest will not otherwise have, the
likelihood that such a party will bring suit is enhanced. The calculation is sim-
ilar when the cause of action is derivative and the contingent costs will reduce
the recovery of the corporation and thus, pro rata, that of other shareholders.
150. See infra notes 201-23 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
152. It is possible to make an interesting parallel argument in the case of
solicitations not for pecuniary gain. Consider In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
[Vol. 73:425
1988] DERIVATIVE SUITS AND LEGAL ETHICS 461
This assessment is an indication that any such suit having for-
mal merit will not result in a waste of resources and is a more
than acceptable substitute for endorsement by a self-selected
individual plaintiff.
In summary, solicitation is not unequivocally immoral; the
free-rider problem minimizes concern with most solicitational
dangers and means that it is foreseeable that no nominal plain-
tiff will step forward to enforce the interests that Congress in-
tended section 16(b) to protect; management judgment is
irrelevant to an assessment of the value of section 16(b) suits;
and congressional and court approval of section 16(b) causes of
action eliminates verification problems. The case for the allow-
ance of attorney solicitation thus becomes clear. In other
words, because the dangers addressed by bans on solicitation
are not significant in the section 16(b) context, and because the
self-interest of attorneys is necessary for enforcement, there is
no need to preclude solicitation in the circumstances giving rise
to a section 16(b) cause of action. Consequently, an attempt in
this area to ban any type of solicitation, including in-person so-
licitation, without a requisite showing of actual harm should
fail to withstand careful constitutional scrutiny.153 Moreover,
such a regulation of attorney conduct runs counter to articu-
lated public policy and should be reconsidered.
Part IV discusses the precise tailoring of an exception to
the existing blanket rules against solicitation. At present, how-
ever, it is necessary to reiterate that a premise of the discussion
above is that there is an existing practice of bringing section
16(b) actions on a contingent fee and expense basis. The'pre-
ceding discussion assumed the existence of contingent fee and
expense arrangements for two reasons. The practice is neces-
sary if such actions are to proceed. In addition, the practice as-
sures that a cause of action deemed worthy in the abstract is
brought only when valid in particular factual circumstances.
This Article will discuss the ethical implications of contingent
fee and expense arrangements in Part III(B).
4. Solicitation of Other Derivative Actions
Most derivative actions, unlike section 16(b) causes of ac-
tion, are not specially favored. In fact, in view of the proce-
(1978), in which the obvious strength of the soliciting attorney's convictions
might be said to provide an acceptable substitute form of verification.
153. See the standards discussed in Part III(A)(2), supra.
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dural barriers,154  courts and legislatures arguably have
identified most derivative litigation as disfavored. The reasons
for this treatment largely relate to a perception that, because
no individual shareholder has a sufficient interest in bringing
litigation to benefit all shareholders, the primary motivation
for the initiation of such a suit must be a desire to achieve a
personal benefit through settlement or the like. 55 Even when
the shareholder bringing suit is attempting to bring about a
change in corporate policy rather than trying to extract a pay-
off, courts and commentators generally suspect self-interest.156
In other words, the very feature of derivative litigation that dis-
courages its instigation-lack of a substantial personal benefit
to individual shareholders--casts doubt on the legitimacy of
those actions that shareholders do bring.157
While this lack of adequate self-interest suggests that
shareholders often will not be motivated to bring derivative ac-
tions, it also indicates that considerations of overbearing, undue
influence, and invasion of privacy should not be substantial in
the usual derivative context. Thus, one can generally dispose of
these arguable justifications for antisolicitation regulations as
simply there as in the context of Section 16(b). 158
In contrast, lack of management interest in the non-16(b)
derivative action context is more troubling. The circumstances
giving rise to section 16(b) causes of action typically suggest
that management self-interest may impede the bringing of such
actions, but this is not consistently the case in situations that
might support instigation of derivative. litigation. For instance,
154. See supra notes 35-48, 56-58 and accompanying text.
155. Even though settlements of derivative actions now are subject to court
scrutiny, see supra note 48 and accompanying text, this has not always been
the case. See Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholder Actions-
Part 1, 22 Sw. L.J. 767, 784 (1968) (discussing adequacy of representation in set-
tlement that lawyer affords to class). Moreover, out-of-court accomodations
still may take place.
156. A similar bias is present in the federal rules governing which share-
holder proposals management must include in its proxy statement. See Cane,
The Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System: Attitudes, Results and
Perspectives, 11 J. CORP. L. 57, 89 (1985).
157. The fact that § 16(b) litigation has avoided the same taint may be the
result of its relative ease of proof. Thus, if a shareholder files such an action,
courts can easily evaluate any later decision to drop it. This is less likely the
case with other derivative litigation, where a decision to abandon prosecution
frequently might be due to difficulty or uncertainty, and thus raise no flag as
to the likelihood of side agreements.
Another explanation is, of course, that even if § 16(b) suits were the result
of self-interest, such suits would still satisfy the section's primary policies.
158. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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when the corporation's right is against a third party and there
is no allegation of management wrongdoing, there is no general
reason to doubt that management itself will fully protect the
corporation's interests. 159
Perhaps not surprisingly, however, the law relating to de-
rivative actions already has attempted to respond to the dichot-
omy just suggested. Thus, the demand requirement1 60 and
rules relating to management dismissal of derivative actions 6 1
contemplate different results when, on the one hand, third par-
ties are the objects of suit and when, on the other, the suit im-
plicates management self-interests. 62 Attorneys operating on a
contingent fee basis will doubtless be aware of these distinc-
tions. Accordingly, it is relatively less likely that attorneys will
solicit nominal plaintiffs in situations requiring demand on di-
rectors and deference to a management determination to termi-
nate the suit.
In those instances, however, in which allegations of under-
lying management wrongdoing are the basis of derivative ac-
tions, it is important to determine whether the evaluation of
the worth of a particular cause of action by an attorney solicit-
ing employment is an adequate or necessary substitute for man-
agement discretion. Here, the role played by the contingent fee
continues to be relevant.163 If an attorney will receive payment
only if a suit successfully generates benefit to the corporation,
and if courts will supervise determinations of that success, the
attorney should be cautious in determining whether a suit has
formal merit. As described above, however, formal merit does
159. In other words, in terms of determining which sorts of actions against
third parties justify dedication of attorney resources, there is no reason to be-
lieve that management's lack of interest does not constitute a reliable indica-
tor of an action's lack of worth. Moreover, in such circumstances, any
disregard of management's decision would indicate a lack of regard for the cor-
porate form of organization, which carries with it inherent notions of manage-
ment authority, and thus a lack of regard for the choice of the majority of
shareholders-who have voluntarily engaged in the corporate enterprise-to
defer to such decision. Cf supra note 100 (addressing value of respect for au-
tonomy). When the right in question is against management, however, there is
substantially more reason to think that derivative action-either shareholder
or attorney-initiated-will be necessary for vindication, and that lack of man-
agement interest in enforcement is not a reliable assessment of lack of worth.
160. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
162. See supra text accompanying note 38. Note, however, that the applica-
tion by Delaware courts of their own business judgment in evaluating dismis-
sals, see supra note 39, reduces the indicated contrast.
163. The relevance of security-for-expense requirements also should be ob-
vious. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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not necessarily indicate either that prosecution of the suit will
lead to an efficent allocation of resources or that the suit is so-
cially worthwhile. In this regard, it is critical to note both that
derivative litigation generally lacks the affirmations of social
value that courts and Congress have bestowed on section 16(b)
suits,'1 and that there is increasing legislative interest in cut-
ting down on management liability in general.1 65
In summary, there is less arguable need for solicitation in
the context of the ordinary derivative action than in the section
16(b) context. There is no clear public policy specially favoring
ordinary derivative actions166 and, at least in regard to those
causes of action not alleging underlying management wrongdo-
ing, the existence of a body of managers charged with providing
for corporate well-being seems to adequately address the free-
rider problem described above.167
The question remains, however, whether lack of general
need for solicitation justifies suppression of such activity. The
dangers that solicitation presents in the derivative context are
limited to the possibilities that lawyers will "stir up" litigation
and that the activities involved will give the appearance of im-
propriety. Although regulations of commercial speech require
only reduced scrutiny,168 it is not clear that these limited risks,
by themselves, are adequate justification-from either a consti-
tutional or policy standpoint-for ethical regulators to prohibit
solicitation of derivative lawsuits.
164. There may be some distinctions, however, among kinds of non-16(b)
derivative suits. See infra notes 227-45 and accompanying text.
165. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
166. But see infra notes 230-38 and accompanying text (discussing relative
preference for cases based on duty of loyalty).
167. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. There may be instances,
however, in which management fails to act in the corporation's best interests
for reasons other than self-interest. In these instances, monitoring of manage-
ment may have free-rider implications. There is, of course, a substantial body
of scholarship attributing monitoring effects to various market forces. See,
e.g., Fischel, Efikiient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Con-
tro4 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1, 1-7 (1978);
Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 42 (1980). Although these effects pre-
sumably would monitor both self-interest and other forms of management der-
eliction, it is extremely doubtful that they would extend to detection or
correction of dereliction with respect to individual causes of action.
168. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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B. ACQUIRING AN INTEREST IN LITIGATION
1. In General
The second major category of ethical considerations
presented by the practices of attorneys involved in section 16(b)
and other derivative suits encompasses the use of contingent
fee and expense arrangements169 and other circumstances giv-
ing attorneys a "direct" financial interest in the outcome of liti-
gation. These other circumstances arguably include the
attorney's acquisition of shares of the corporation ostensibly
benefited by the litigation.170 They do not, however, include
such interests as reputational enhancement and future ability
to command higher fees as a result of successful outcomes;
these "indirect" interests have never been within the stated
ambit of professional ethical concerns.
At least five dangers may be associated with an attorney's
procurement of a direct financial interest in litigation. First,
commentators have suggested that such an interest may lead
the attorney to be overzealous.171 In other words, the attorney
may be more inclined to go beyond the limits of permissible ad-
vocacy when there is a personal stake in the outcome. A per-
sonal stake, however, may describe either a direct or indirect
financial interest. Any incentives to push the boundaries of ap-
proved conduct in these two circumstances vary only by a mat-
ter of degree. For example, an attorney seeking reputational
enhancement or fearing reputational injury may have a motiva-
tion to win that is nearly as strong as that of the attorney with
a direct financial interest. The regulation of the latter but not
the former is curious, but may be attributable to expediency.172
Just as curious, perhaps, is regulatory concern with the
overzealousness that an attorney's direct financial interest in-
duces, considering that parties-in-interest, including attorneys
themselves, may appear pro se.'73
The second arguable danger is one specifically posed by the
use of contingency fees. Here, the relevant concern is that law-
yers will use their superior knowledge and abilities to negotiate
169. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
171. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 8.13, at 490.
172. The difficulty of prohibiting reputational enhancement is manifest.
173. This self-representation is, of course, notwithstanding the foolishness
of the client. Cf. THE CONCISE OxFoRD DICIONARY OF PROVERBS 130 (J.
Simpson ed. 1982) ("A man who is his own lawyer has a fool for his client.").
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
percentage fee agreements not fairly reflecting either costs' 74
to the lawyer or the risk of nonrecovery.175 The tendency to
use the same percentage fee for cases that vary in strength pro-
vides evidence of this practice, as does the fact that so many
cases are settled that there is little actual risk of attorney
loss.'76 Still, in any circumstance in which courts must approve
fee awards,177 the relevance of any agreement between attorney
and client is secondary, at best,178 significantly reducing con-
cern about this danger.
The third possible danger is that even when the financial
interests of client and attorney are formally aligned, the attor-
ney may be tempted to follow his or her own instincts in mak-
ing decisions ordinarily thought to be those of the client.179
Thus, the attorney may deprive the client of the opportunity to
make, or have input into, strategy decisions and value judg-
ments. 8 0 In effect, the lawyer may treat the client simply
as the lawyer's "key to the courthouse door," a result that
conflicts with traditional views of the attorney-client
relationship.' 8 '
The fourth possible danger is related to the third, but ap-
pears even more troubling. When an attorney has a financial
174. For this purpose, this Article assumes that a lawyer determines costs
in terms of forgone opportunities for income production, together with out-of-
pocket expenditures.
175. See Note, Duty to Make Counsel Available, supra note 73, at 1200.
176. Grady, Some Ethical Questions about Percentage Fees, LITIGATION,
Summer 1976, at 20, 24.
177. Court approval is, as described above, required in most derivative con-
texts. See supra notes 27-28, 51-52 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Note, Class Actions, supra note 87, at 1607 (noting
court's general power to override fee contracts).
179. This may be conceptualized as a type of overreaching. See supra notes
110-15 and accompanying text. As such, it has implications for the exercise of
the client's autonomy. See supra note 100.
180. After all, even when the client's interests generally parallel those of
the attorney, the client may hold different opinions and values.
181. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-7 ("In certain areas of legal rep-
resentation not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing
the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But
otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client
.... "); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation... and shall con-
sult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."). For
accounts of the practical allocation of power between client and attorney, see
Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 1120, 1120-39 (1968); Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structur-
ing the Lawyer-Cient Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 1003, 1003 n.3.
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interest in the outcome of litigation, there may be circum-
stances in which the interests of attorney and client diverge.
For instance, an attorney who already has devoted as much
time to a suit as a contingent fee would compensate in the
event of complete triumph at trial may be eager to settle rather
than to devote additional time to preparing and trying the
case.'82 This eagerness will increase as the likelihood of pre-
vailing at trial decreases. L83 By contrast, the lawyer's sunk
costs will not affect the client's attitude toward settlement or
continuing to trial.'84 The resulting conflict of interest has
been the subject of substantial comment.1 s5 Nonetheless, ethi-
cal regulations could significantly reduce this concern, if not re-
move it entirely, merely by requiring disclosure of the
existence and ramifications of the conflict.'8 6 After all, provi-
sions more generally regulating attorney-client conflicts of in-
182. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Reponwsibility, 90
HARV. L. REV. 702, 732 (1977). Similarly, consider a situation in which (1) an
attorney is relatively certain that the client will recover $100,000 at trial, 30%
of which ($30,000) the client would pay to the lawyer as the set percentage fee;
(2) the attorney already has expended $20,000 (for purposes of simplicity, com-
posed of amounts paid to investigators, paralegals, and associate attorneys);
(3) bringing the case to trial will require expenditure of an additional $10,000;
and (4) the client receives a settlement offer of $80,000, 30% of which ($24,000)
would go to the lawyer. The lawyer presumably would prefer settlement,
which would reward him or her with $24,000 on a $20,000 investment, rather
than trial, as a result of which the lawyer would break even. The client, how-
ever, will net only $56,000 from the settlement, compared to $70,000 from pre-
vailing at trial.
In both the section 16(b) and ordinary derivative contexts, courts will
award attorneys' fees. As discussed, see supra text accompanying notes 28, 51-
52, courts generally base the calculation on hours worked multiplied by an
hourly charge adjusted for results achieved and other factors. Although this
calculation should mean that the attorney's preferences are less rigidly defined
than in the preceding example, there is still ample opportunity for conflict of
interest.
183. The reduced likelihood of winning at trial, however, would also affect
the client's preferences.
184. See supra note 182.
185. See, e.g., D. RosENTHAL, LAwmE AND CuEmT WHO'S IN CHARGE? 96-
116 (1974); Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 529, 534-37 (1978); Morgan, supra note 182, at 732; Note, Of Ethics
and Economics: Contingent Percentage Fees for Legal Services, 16 AKRON L.
REv. 747, 749-51 (1983).
186. For instance, although hourly payments to lawyers also pose a formal
conflict of interest-because a client prefers to pay less and a lawyer prefers to
receive more-the conflict is so obvious that clients generally are left to watch
out for themselves. The only protection provided by the Model Code or the
Model Rules inheres, respectively, in the requirement that no fee be illegal or
clearly excessive, MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 2-106(A), and in the require-
ment that fees be reasonable, MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(a).
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terest rely heavily on disclosure as a "remedy."'187
Consequently, adequate attorney disclosure to a consenting cli-
ent of the conflicts inherent in contingent fee and expense ar-
rangements should alleviate a significant proportion of ethical
discomfort with such potential conflicts.
The fifth possible danger involves the effect of an attor-
ney's direct financial interest on the manner in which the po-
tential plaintiff weighs the costs of litigation against its benefits
to determine whether to pursue an action. Traditionally, it is
up to the potential plaintiff to perform a cost-benefit analysis in
deciding whether to bring, and how far to pursue, a particular
suit. Whenever the potential plaintiff does not bear all the
costs and reap all the benefits of the suit, however, there is a
significant danger that the decision will not be the most effi-
cient one.
To illustrate this danger, consider a simple breach of con-
tract case brought by an attorney, on behalf of an individual
plaintiff, pursuant to an hourly fee agreement.188 From the
standpoint of the self-interested client, it is efficient to pursue
the cause of action as long as the anticipated recovery out-
weighs the anticipated cost of the hourly retainer and other
miscellaneous expenses.'89 Provided there is alternative em-
ployment at an equivalent hourly rate,190 the self-interested
lawyer should be indifferent to whether the plaintiff continues
the suit.
Substituting a contingent fee arrangement for the hourly
arrangement, however, distorts the simplicity of the analysis.
For instance, when recovery is highly unlikely and large
amounts of attorney time will be required to bring the suit to
187. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-104(A) (allowing business
transactions involving differing interests between lawyer and client to proceed
after full disclosure and client's consent); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule
1.8(a) (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-105(C) (allowing multiple rep-
resentation after full disclosure and consent, except when it is not obvious
lawyer can adequately represent interests of each client); MODEL RULES, supra
note 2, Rule 1.7(a) (same general effect); MODEL CODE, supr note 2, DR 5-
101(A) (allowing lawyer to accept employment when lawyer's professional
judgment may be affected by lawyer's own interests if client consents after
full disclosure); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(b) (same, provided law-
yer reasonably believes representation will not be adversely affected).
188. For simplicity, all examples will involve plaintiff's attorneys, although
the same general considerations may arise with respect to defense counsel.
189. This conclusion assumes that courts generally will not allow shifting
of the plaintiff's attorneys' fees to the defendant. See supr note 69.
190. Alternative equivalent employment may or may not be available. See
infra note 205.
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trial,19' a client nonetheless might choose to prosecute the case,
believing that there is nothing to lose. Conversely, in the same
situation,192 the lawyer may prefer to settle or abandon the
suit. Consequently, the outcome may depend on who actually
controls the litigation.
Although the foregoing discussion demonstrates potential
dangers, not all of these will exist every time an attorney ac-
quires a financial interest in litigation. Moreover, absent other
factors, obtaining an interest in a client's litigation is not intui-
tively immoral.193 This means that ethical restraints on such
acquisitions are preventive in nature. As a result, there may be
instances in which strict application of this sort of regulation
precludes desirable consequences. This fact has become suffi-
ciently clear to justify approval of contingent fee arrangements
in most civil suits,19 4 as well as toleration of contingent expense
arrangements in a number of jurisdictions.195 No jurisdiction,
however, has attempted to develop specific rules for contingent
fee and expense arrangements other than to stipulate that they
must be in writing. 96 Consideration of the utility of such ar-
rangements in section 16(b) and derivative litigation suggests
the shape of a few additional requirements.
2. Acquisition of an Interest in Section 16(b) Actions
The concerns suggested above are substantially less impor-
tant in the context of section 16(b) litigation than they are in
the abstract. First, the relative clarity of section 16(b) suits
should substantially alleviate concern with overzealousness, be-
cause in many instances attorneys should not need to use ques-
tionable practices197 or assertions in order to prevail. Second,
the requirement that courts approve fees paid out of the section
191. This scenario assumes, of course, that the lawyer entered into the con-
tingent fee arrangement before understanding that the chance of recovery was
so dim.
192. Consider also the situation described in note 182, supra.
193. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 77 (citing MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.8(e)); see
also supra note 2 (discussing number of jurisdictions adopting Model Rules).
196. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(c). This statement of course
disregards the exclusions for criminal and domestic cases, see supra note 76, as
well as the statement of the Model Code, supra note 2, EC 2-20, that lawyers
generally should not use contingent fees if the client can afford a fixed fee, see
supra note 76; see also supra note 186 (discussing requirements that all fees be
reasonable or not excessive).
197. This statement obviously excepts the practices of soliciting and ob-
taining an interest in the outcome of litigation.
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16(b) litigation award198 limits the possibility that attorneys
will mislead nominal plaintiffs when establishing the contin-
gent fee and reduces the significance of any misleading that
does occur. Third, as discussed above, the nominal plaintiff
does not have substantial personal interests in section 16(b) liti-
gation, so his or her interest in controlling the lawsuit may not
be a significant one.199 In response to the fourth danger, disclo-
sure can alleviate conflict of interest concerns in section 16(b)
actions to the same extent as in any other context. Moreover,
the requirement that a court approve any termination of litiga-
tion brought under section 16(b)200 provides substantial assur-
ance that lawyers subject to such conflicts will not ride
roughshod over the other interests at stake.
Finally, in section 16(b) litigation, concern over fragmented
cost-benefit analysis takes on a somewhat different character.
In fact, substituting almost any other type of lawsuit for the in-
dividual breach of contract action, previously referred to in the
simple model set forth in Part III(B)(1), significantly compli-
cates matters. The popular view is that remedies for breach of
contract are premised exclusively on policies looking to plain-
tiff compensation.20 1 Other types of actions may have addi-
tional social benefits, such as deterring unwanted forms of
conduct.20 2 In the latter types of actions, a plaintiff anticipating
only an award directed at personal compensation 20 3 will, from a
social perspective, undervalue the benefits of the suit.
In derivative-type lawsuits the problem of undervaluation
is even more pronounced. A nominal plaintiff conducting a
198. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
199. Moreover, to the extent one views the nominal plaintiff as a represen-
tative of either the corporation or those similarly situated, it is obvious that
the plaintiff's autonomy with respect to suit management already is substan-
tially constrained. To the extent that autonomy of the corporation itself might
be a concern, such concern is subordinate to public policy in § 16(b) cases. See
supra text following note 145.
200. See supra text accompanying note 25.
201. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18, at 896 (1982) (stating
that "the law's goal on breach of contract is not to deter breach by compelling
the promisor to perform, but rather to redress breach by compensating the
promisee").
202. See W. KETTON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at
25 (5th ed. 1984) ("The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm has
been quite important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only
with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.").
203. Actually, in light of the American system's rejection of fee shifting,
any such "making whole" necessarily will be imperfect. See Rowe, Fee Shift-
ing, supra note 69, at 657-59.
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cost-benefit analysis from a personal standpoint will tend to
give any societal value other than the amount of recovery short
shrift and also will be likely to disregard most of the value of
the recovery itself. There is no straightforward way to force
the nominal plaintiff to place a more appropriate value on the
amount recovered from the defendant, short of permitting the
plaintiff to keep the entire award. This solution would create a
windfall, however, and presumably would result in litigious-
ness, races to the courthouse, and similar consequences.
In the typical section 16(b) lawsuit, however, there is an-
other party logically available, and in fact somewhat more
prone, to conduct a serious cost-benefit analysis.204 This, of
course, is the attorney operating on a contingent fee and ex-
pense basis.20 5 As already noted, the attorney also may be in-
clined to conduct any cost-benefit analysis from a personal
standpoint.2 06 Nonetheless, in a lawsuit based on section 16(b),
the lawyer's perspective is much more likely than that of
the nominal plaintiff to mirror the broad and presumably desir-
able social perspective. 20 7 As long as the attorney expects to
recover opportunity costs2 8 and out-of-pocket expenses, appro-
priately risk-adjusted,20 9 he or she will be inclined to pursue
204. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50 (discussing why nominal
plaintiff readily may defer to evaluation of lawyer).
205. An attorney receiving an hourly fee should, as a matter of professional
responsibility, advise the client of the chances of recovery and aid the client in
making the necessary assessments. In the absence of a contingent fee arrange-
ment, however, the attorney will have no strongfinancial incentive for doing
so. Moreover, in the absence of alternative employment, the attorney may
even have an incentive to conceal poor chances of recovery in order to increase
billing hours.
206. Thus, the lawyer with a direct financial interest may be motivated to
substitute an analysis of his or her own costs and benefits for those of the cli-
ent and to manipulate information and strategies accordingly.
207. In some circumstances, however, the lawyer's perspective may be
somewhat different. For example, an attorney may seek to extract some value
from the litigation other than victory, such as becoming known in the field.
See supra text accompanying notes 171-73. For the most part, however, even
an attorney with this kind of interest will prefer to prevail, and will screen
cases accordingly. Only when the lawyer is motivated by something on the or-
der of an irrational dislike of the defendant is the lawyer's perspective apt to
vastly diverge from that assumed in the text.
208. These costs include, of course, an element of forgone profit. Although
calculation of opportunity costs presents substantial difficulties, see Conard,
supra note 41, at 282-83, the attorney's ordinary billing rate is a possible start-
ing point.
209. To the extent that a premium over actual costs must be allowed to
provide adequate incentive to bear risk, its discounted present value should
not vastly exceed actual costs at any given time. Moreover, when the cause of
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the suit,2 10 and thus aid in the effectuation of section 16(b)'s un-
derlying policy goals.
Accordingly, if the lawyer is assured of recovering the risk-
adjusted amount described above,211 up to the full amount ex-
tracted from the defendant,212 maximization of the lawyer's
own welfare should lead to the closest approximation of the so-
action is relatively certain, the risk of nonrecovery is not great and a substan-
tial premium may not be necessary. Thus, the risk premium in the typical
§,16(b) case need not be large. With respect to the many difficulties that may
be encountered in attempting to determine an appropriate risk premium, how-
ever, see Leubsdorf, supra note 69, at 497-501 (analyzing practice of awarding
"contingency bonuses for lawyers who successfully bring marginal cases") and
Rowe, Recent Developments, supra note 52, at 632-34 (discussing Supreme
Court's dispproval of enhancements based on quality of lawyer's work).
210. Thus, a lawyer whose opportunity and other costs always approximate
30% of recovery, and who expects to receive a constant 30% of any recovery,
generally would prefer to prosecute, rather than settle, as long as the probable
magnitude of recovery at trial, multiplied by the likelihood of prevailing, out-
weighs the settlement offer. This preference parallels the preferences of a cli-
ent who would receive the full recovery in question, but would expect to pay
the costs of litigation, calculated at a constant 30% of recovery. Similarly,
when the lawyer's costs vary as a proportion of recovery, but the client reim-
burses them, the same incentive structure should apply. Unlike the attorney
employed on an hourly fee basis, an attorney employed pursuant to a contin-
gent arrangement will have unreimbursed sunk costs, and thus will not be
even theoretically indifferent as between continuing suit and taking alternate
employment.
211. Whenever actual costs exceed, or are less than, prospective fee recov-
eries, the attorney's incentive structure will not necessarily lead to the desira-
ble social outcome. Remarkably, however, permitting a lawyer's contingent
fee recovery to equal actual costs appropriately adjusts the incentive structure
in all instances except those in which the lawyer's input of time and other
costs already exceeds total prospective recovery. Thus, when a lawyer believes
the contingent return, appropriately risk-discounted, will cover costs and pro-
vide a reasonable profit, the appropriate motivation will exist for deciding
when a suit should be settled or brought to trial. Only when an error already
has led to an expenditure of effort that cannot be compensated is this not the
case. This type of miscalculation, however, is less likely in the § 16(b) context,
because validity of a cause of action based on particular facts is often fairly
easy to assess. It is hoped, therefore, that reasonably vigilant lawyers will not
often find themselves in a situation in which they already have "over-ex-
pended." This should be particularly true if, because of lack of client interest,
the attorney wields substantial control over suit termination. But see the dis-
cussion of the critical role of court approval of such determinations in the text
accompanying note 223, infra. Commentators have argued that when the
maximum possible recovery from a defendant is very high, but its probability
of being recovered is very low, an attorney will, from a social desirability
standpoint, have an over-incentive to bring suit. See Conard, supra note 41, at
281-82. This is not true, however, unless the attorney calculates the fee as a
percentage of recovery.
212. This limit is logically derived by application of the "benefit" exception
to the general refusal to fee-shift. See supra note 50.
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cially desirable result-the largest recovery from the pool of
potential defendants213-that is available as long as enforce-
ment is in private hands.21 4 This conclusion is related to the
idea that enforcement of section 16(b) requires that attorneys'
fees not be niggardly.2 1 5 It goes substantially further, however,
in describing how courts are to calculate such fees and in limit-
ing them only by the amount extracted from the defendant.
Three caveats, however, are in order. First, to the extent
that the deterrent value of a suit is higher than the amount
that the suit may extract from the defendant,216 attorney self-
interest will not completely reflect social interest. Neither, of
course, will the interest of the nominal plaintiff, who typically
will not consider either social interest or the amount of recov-
ery benefiting other shareholders. 217 Nevertheless, as sug-
gested above, this result is virtually unavoidable as long as
enforcement is in private hands.2 1 8
213. Here, it seems fair to assume that, from a public policy standpoint, all
payments extracted from defendants in settlement or in satisfaction of judg-
ment represent social good.
214. Consideration of the desirability of a cause of action from a broad, so-
cial perspective presumably would take into account the costs and benefits of
both prosecution and defense. See Conard, supra note 41, at 271-73. This as-
sertion should be especially true in common-law derivative suits, when the
corporation on behalf of which suit is brought is aligned as a nominal defend-
ant. See id Any attempt to select the viewpoint of a single individual as sur-
rogate for the social perspective must necessarily sacrifice this
comprehensiveness, however, unless one makes some allowance for the shift-
ing of the prevailing party's attorneys' fees and other expenses as an induce-
ment to the other party to take them into account. See id at 284-85
(suggesting that fees and expenses that defense incurs be reflected, in appro-
priate cases, in assessments against initiating attorney). The American system,
however, generally has rejected such shifting. See Rowe, Fee Shifting, supra
note 69, at 657-59. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text, for a discus-
sion of the idea that enforcement by public agencies may be the best way to
deal with "spillover" benefits.
215. See supra text accompanying note 88.
216. The desired level of deterrence in connection with § 16(b) suits ap-
pears to be located precisely at the point at which the insider has no affirma-
tive incentive to engage in short-swing trading on the basis of inside
information. See supra note 69.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 203-04.
218. Moreover, whenever deterrent value is higher than the amount to be
paid to the plaintiff, other, often public, enforcement mechanisms may be
brought into play. For instance, private enforcement actions, Securities and
Exchange Commission enforcement actions, and criminal prosecutions brought
against violators of Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988), no doubt supple-
ment § 16(b)'s effect on trading involving actual use of inside information.
Here, it is relevant to note the increased sanctions made available to the Com-
mission by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98
Stat. 1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986)) and the Insider
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The second difficulty presented by the argument that attor-
ney self-interest can be an adequate proxy for social interests is
that under this model courts may allow the lawyer a fee equal
to the full amount extracted from the defendant. This result is
less objectionable than full recovery by the nominal plaintiff,
because recovery by the lawyer is not a windfall-the lawyer
will have worked for it. Nonetheless, it may be disturbing to
contemplate an arrangement in which there is virtually no
monetary benefit to the corporation ostensibly represented.
Such circumstances are not unheard-of, however, when fees are
paid on an hourly, noncontingent basis. In addition, such a situ-
ation should not be distressing when the primary benefit of liti-
gation is defined in terms of the effect on the adverse party.
Section 16(b) is a perfect example of this; that section 16(b)
does not require misuse of inside information, or even injury to
the corporation, as a predicate to suit and the refusal to permit
the "injured" corporation to decide when its own interests out-
weigh the bringing of the suit make clear that the purpose of
the cause of action is deterrence rather than recompense.219
The third and most serious problem connected with the
"lawyer as social proxy" argument involves the role of the
courts in approving fee awvards and settlements. As indicated
above, lawyers will be motivated to enforce section 16(b) most
appropriately if they anticipate recovery of their risk-adjusted
opportunity costs and out-of-pocket expenditures. This has im-
plications for the calculation of court-approved fee awards.220
The most important such implication is that courts must be
clearly willing to permit the awards thus computed to ap-
proach, or even to equal, the amount paid by the defendant.221
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-704,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1304 (pt. II) (Sept. 21, 1988).
219. See also supra note 11 (citing preamble to § 16(b)).
220. See supra text accompanying note 28 (discussing current approach to
fee calculation).
221. To the extent that one requires precedent for this adjustment, it
might be found in the recent case of City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561
(1986), awarding $33,350 in damages and $245,456.25 as attorneys' fees, in
which a plurality of the Supreme Court determined that the amount recovered
by the plaintiff in a civil rights action did not dictate the amount of attorneys'
fees to be awarded against the defendant. Id. at 580. The plurality declined
even to allow the amount recovered to act as a ceiling on attorneys' fees. Id.
When the fee award comes out of the common fund created, however, see
supra note 50, the size of the fund logically does limit the size of the award. It
is important to note, however, that the Court did not regard results achieved
as irrelevant; rather, the plurality indicated that damages awarded did not re-
flect fully the public benefit advanced by the litigation. Id at 574. If system-
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To date, there is no indication that this clear willingness
exists.222
The effect of "clear willingness" on attorney motivation
also has implications for the courts' role in approving settle-
ments. It is foreseeable that, at some point in litigation, a law-
yer will perceive that continued prosecution will require inputs
of time or other resources not likely to increase the recovery
enough to cover the lawyer's increased costs.22 At this point,
the lawyer presumably will prefer to attempt a settlement. If
the court does not permit settlement-perhaps because trial
may result in a higher gross payment from the defendant-the
lawyer may incur a loss. Moreover, refusals to allow settle-
ments in such instances may negatively affect the incentives for
other lawyers contemplating section 16(b) enforcement actions.
Accordingly, courts should relate settlement determinations, as
well as fee awards, to the lawyer's risk-adjusted opportunity
costs. Courts must clearly acknowledge and understand this re-
lation in order to achieve the most favorable impact on attor-
ney motivation.
3. Acquisition of an Interest in Other Derivative Litigation
The arguable dangers that an attorney's direct financial in-
terest in litigation presents are, as described above, overzealous-
ness, misleading the client, impairment of client control,
conflict of interest, and fragmented cost-benefit analysis.22
Discussion of most of these dangers in the context of common-
law derivative actions parallels the above discussion in the con-
text of section 16(b) litigation.
Thus, as is the case with section 16(b) litigation, the role of
the courts in approving fee awards may alleviate concern over
misleading the nominal plaintiff. Moreover, the interests of the
nominal plaintiff in most derivative litigation, like the interests
of the section 16(b) shareholder litigant, will be minimal and
impersonal; thus, the interest in controlling litigation will not
be significant. Similarly, as in the section 16(b) context, court
atic deterrence value is attributed to the § 16(b) action, the same reasoning
would seem to apply. For discussion and criticism of Rivera, see Rowe, Recent
Developments, supra note 52, at 623-27.
222. The split in the Supreme Court in Rivera provides evidence of the
lack of universal endorsement of fee awards of this magnitude. See supra note
221.
223. See supra note 182.
224. See supra notes 171-92 and accompanying text.
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approval of suit termination can alleviate conflict of interest
concerns for most derivative litigation.
There are, however, two differences between analysis of di-
rect financial interests for purposes of section 16(b) and analy-
sis for other derivative litigation. Because of the relatively
difficult nature of most derivative actions,22 there may be
more opportunity for overzealousness than arises in the context
of fairly straightforward section 16(b) litigation. A more impor-
tant difference, however, involves the treatment of fragmented
cost-benefit analysis and the conclusion that using the self-in-
terest of attorneys to override the self-interest of the nominal
plaintiff may be necessary to effectuate public policy. This im-
portant difference is attributable to the varying purposes of the
relevant suits.
a. Suits Against Third Parties
With respect to those derivative causes of action not pre-
mised on management wrongdoing, deterrence is, at best, a sub-
sidiary goal. The threat to a third party of being sued by means
of a cumbersome derivative action probably adds little deter-
rence value to the prospect of being sued by the corporation it-
self. It is much more apposite to characterize the availability of
derivative remedies in such cases as a "steam valve" for dis-
gruntled shareholders, one of several available methods of
drawing the presence of possible corporate claims to the atten-
tion of management, or an indirect way of assuring that the
evaluation called for by management's duty of care is made,
even if management itself does not make it. 2 26 In these circum-
stances, responding to deficiencies in the incentives of nominal
plaintiffs by enhancing attorney incentives is not a particularly
compelling solution. In other words, motivating attorneys to
prosecute suits by allowing their fees to approach or consume
total recoveries may be inappropriate when the goal of the suit
is not defined primarily in terms of its effect on the potential
defendant class.
225. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text and infra notes 226-45
and accompanying text.
226. Attempts to articulate the deterrence value of derivative lawsuits
against third parties in terms of effect on management ultimately must fail.
Although it may be mildly embarrassing to management to have a successful
derivative suit brought against a third party, this mild embarrassment is not
apt to be a powerful motivator. Bringing such a suit may or may not cause an
otherwise disinclined management to evaluate its merits.
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b. Suits Against Management
For purposes of analysis, this Article divides derivative
causes of action premised on underlying management wrongdo-
ing into two primary categories. 227 The first of these implicates
management's duty of loyalty;228 the second implicates manage-
ment's duty of care.229
i. The Duty of Loyalty
The fiduciary duty of loyalty requires good faith and fair
dealing toward the beneficiaries of the duty2 0 and prohibits the
fiduciary from taking advantage of such beneficiaries by means
of fraudulent or unfair transactions.231 In some contexts, the fi-
duciary acts improperly simply by maintaining a state of affairs
in which the fiduciary has a conflict of interest with the benefi-
ciary2 32 Traditional classifications of violations of the duty in-
clude competing with the corporation, usurping corporate
227. There are ways in which corporate managers or directors can be guilty
of malfeasance or nonfeasance of duty that might not strictly fall under the
duty of care or duty of loyalty labels. One example is the duty to act intra
vires and within the authority of the position held. Under one view, directors
and officers are absolutely liable for any loss to the corporation resulting from
ultra vires acts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 383 comment b
(1958); 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 1021-28 (rev. vol. 1986). Under another view, they are liable only when they
negligently or knowingly act beyond the scope of the corporation's powers.
See Lappaluoto v. Eggleston, 57 Wash. 2d 393, 402, 357 P.2d 725, 731 (1960).
Nonetheless, these miscellaneous activities often will resemble one of the two
major categories described.
228. For purposes of this Article, the duty of loyalty encompasses the du-
ties of the officer or director to act in good faith toward, and deal fairly with,
the corporation and, in some cases, its shareholders. See infra notes 230-33
and accompanying text. For a general analysis of the elements of the duty of
loyalty, see Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPAL AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusINESS 55, 71-79 (1985); Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 823 (1983). At least some commentators prefer to
refer collectively to these duties simply as "fiduciary duties," distinguished
from the duty of care. See, e.g., H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 31,
§ 231, at 612.
Interestingly, the duty of loyalty itself often is described as a "residual
concept," into which otherwise uncategorized violations often fall. See, e.g., R.
CLARK, supra note 35, § 4.1, at 141; see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 31, § 235, at 627 (describing fiduciary duty as requiring good faith and fair
dealing).
229. As used in this Article, the term duty of care generally contemplates
management's duty to act diligently. See infra note 239 and accompanying
text.
230. See supra note 228.
231. See R. CLARK, supra note 35, § 4.1, at 141.
232. See id.; see generally Frankel, supra note 228, at 808 (discussing inher-
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opportunities, engaging in insider trading, engaging in other
transactions involving conflicts of interest, and oppressing mi-
nority shareholders. 233
Several early applications of the duty of loyalty appear to
have developed primarily as matters of prophylaxis. Examples
include prohibitions against taking advantage of corporate op-
portunities, even when the corporation could not or would not
do so itself,23 and the position that transactions in which man-
agement is interested are voidable, even when not unfair to the
corporation. 2 5 Both of these rules reflected the attitude that
an ounce of prevention was worth a pound of cure. This pre-
ventive approach, however, precluded some transactions that
actually might have been beneficial, or at least not harmful.
This approach foreshadowed the section 16(b) enthusiasm for
general improvement in the conduct of potential defendants,
even at the cost of arguable loss of benefit to a particular entity
ent risk of fiduciary relations and various control methods used to limit breach
of fiduciary duty).
233. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, § 235, at 627.
234. See, e.g., Procario v. 74 & 76 West Tremont Ave. Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 973,
974-75, 169 N.Y.S.2d 39, 39, 146 N.E.2d 795, 795 (1957); Young v. Columbia Oil
Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 370, 158 S.E. 678, 681 (1931). More typically, the director is
not held liable. Northwestern Terra Cotta Corp. v. Wilson, 74 IlM. App. 2d 38,
46-48, 219 N.E.2d 860, 864-65 (1966); Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkle, 311 Ky.
635, 63942, 224 S.W.2d 923, 926-27 (1949); Black v. Parker Mfg. Co., 329 Mass.
105, 111, 106 N.E.2d 544, 549 (1952); see generally Brudney & Clark, A New
Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1981) (arguing that
closely held corporations should be subject to different standard); Slaughter,
The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 18 Sw. L.J. 96 (1964) (summarizing scope
and elements of corporate opportunity doctrine).
235. Alabama Fidelity Mortgage & Bond Co. v. Dubberly, 198 Ala. 545, 549,
73 So. 911, 914 (1916); Hotaling v. Hotaling, 193 Cal. 368, 384, 224 P. 455, 462
(1924); Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning Ry., 103 N.Y. 58, 73-74, 8 N.E.
355, 358 (1886). Other cases have held that interested management transac-
tions are voidable when there is fraud or bad faith, see, e.g., Briggs v. Scripps,
13 Cal. App. 2d 43, 45, 56 P.2d 277, 278 (1936); GOS Cattle Co. v. Bragaw's
Heirs, 38 N.M. 105, 109, 28 P.2d 529, 532 (1933), or unfairness, see, e.g., Craw-
ford v. Mexican Petroleum Co., 130 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1942); Wyman v.
Bowman, 127 F. 257, 274 (8th Cir. 1904). More modern cases tend to apply the
test of whether an independent fiduciary in an arm's length bargain would
have bound the corporation to such a transaction. See, e.g., Murphy v. Wash-
ington Am. League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 490, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (1956); see generally
Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors, 61
HARV. L. REv. 335, 341-42 (1948) (promoting comparison of interested direc-
tor's action with action of independent fiduciary under same circumstances).
With respect to statutory approaches to conflict of interest questions, see
Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A
Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201, 204-23
(1977).
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in a particular case.2 6
There has been substantial relaxation of the positions re-
ferred to above.237 Nonetheless, frequent requirements that
management bear the burden of justificationsa when share-
holders allege that management has breached the duty of loy-
alty suggest a continuing prejudice against the activities in
question and a corresponding attitude that, derivative complica-
tions aside, policing lawsuits should be relatively easy to bring.
ii. The Duty of Care
Directors and officers must, in managing the corporation,
exercise that degree of skill, diligence, and care that a reason-
ably prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances.23 9
Relative to the duty of loyalty, the duty of care reflects more
concern with consequences to the corporation than with deter-
rence or prevention. Courts have traditionally limited recovery
for violations of the duty of care to actual damage caused to the
corporation.20 Moreover, they give wide latitude to the discre-
tion of the corporate decision makers,24 manifesting a disinci-
236. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. For the proposition
that, at least in the context of publicly-held corporations, there is no system-
atic benefit to transactions in which management has an interest, see R.
CLARK, supra note 35, § 5.4.
237. See supra notes 235-36.
238. See, e.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1980); Bellis
v. Thai, 373 F. Supp. 120, 122-23 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd mem, 510 F.2d 969 (3d
Cir. 1975); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 956-57 (Del. Ch. 1980). In
some circumstances, management may shift this burden by demonstrating that
independent shareholders ratified the transaction in question. See, e.g.,
Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 498-99 (Del. 1982); Michelson v.
Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224-25 (Del. 1979).
239. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); R.
CLARK, supra note 35, § 3.4, at 123. Courts sometimes apply an arguably
stricter formulation requiring that the director or officer act as a reasonably
prudent person would act in the conduct of his own affairs. See Selheimer v.
Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 573-79, 224 A.2d 634, 642-43 (1966).
240. See, e.g., Bellis, 373 F. Supp. at 123; Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 619
(S.D.N.Y. 1924); Allied Freightways, Inc. v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 632, 91
N.E.2d 765, 767 (1950).
241. Inactivity has provided the basis for liability under the duty of care.
See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 21, 432 A.2d 814, 817 (1981).
But see Allied Freightways, 325 Mass. at 634-35, 91 N.E.2d at 768-69. Cases
finding reasonably active officers or directors liable, however, are relatively
rare. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indem-
nifwation of Corporate Directors and Offwers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-1100
(1968) (locating only four cases in several decades). For a recent case imposing
liability on the basis of a rather cursory, but not atypical, consideration of a
merger proposal, see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), criticized
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nation either to tinker with corporate control or to constrain
managers substantially in the performance of their duties. The
business judgment rule, which effectively establishes a pre-
sumption "that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company,"' - provides strong evidence of the courts' unwill-
ingness to interfere with corporate management and control.
Recent legislative actions that permit corporations to limit
liability for breaches of the duty of care further support the
view that the law generally should not hamper management's
decision-making functions.2 4 3 Commentary on these legislative
in Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom The Business of Judging Business
Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187, 1188 (1986). It is, in part, this case that has stim-
ulated the legislative activity referred to in the text accompanying note 243,
infra. See Balotti & Gentile, Commentary from the Bar: Elimination or Lim-
itation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5,
7 (1987).
242. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (noting that general corporation law dic-
tates that affairs of corporation are under management of board); Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981) (noting that board decides whether
suit would be detrimental to corporation); see generally Lewis, The Business
Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22
BAYLOR L. REv. 157 (1970) (arguing that business judgment rule appropriately
strikes balance between court control and directors' independent judgment).
Although most often discussed in reference to the actions of directors, the
business judgment rule also applies to officers, see 3A W. FL-rCHER, supra
note 227, § 1029, and, in extraordinary circumstances, to controlling sharehold-
ers, see Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 58, 156 A. 183, 188
(1931).
243. Since early 1986, more than 30 states have adopted legislation relating
to the limitation of liability of directors and, in some cases, officers. See, e.g.,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054 (Supp. 1987); CAL. CORP. CODE § 204 (West
Supp. 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-3-101 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102 (Supp. 1986); see also Balotti & Gentile, supra note 241, at 5 (discussing
Delaware legislation); Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims'
Rights, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 15, 15 (1986-87) (blaming insurance industry for tort
law changes that restrict victims' compensation and litigation rights); Wright,
Colorado Expands Protections for Corporate Directors, 16 COLO. LAw. 1387,
1387-89 (1987) (describing amendment to Colorado Code that limits or elimi-
nates personal liability of directors for duty of care); Note, 1986 Ohio Corpora-
tion Amendments: Expanding the Scope of Director Immunity, 56 U. CIN. L.
REv. 663, 663 (1987) (criticizing Ohio's liberalized indemnification statute).
The typical statute provides that a corporation may include in its articles of
incorporation a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a di-
rector to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for
breaches of fiduciary duty, except with respect to any breach of the director's
duty of loyalty, any acts or omissions not in good faith or involving intentional
misconduct or knowing violation of law, and certain other specified acts. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (Supp. 1986).
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developments has brought to the fore, however, the interesting
points that the same circumstances often may give rise to both
duty of care and duty of loyalty considerations, and that, in
practice, the lines between the two are quite hazy.24  As a co-
rollary, it is possible that plaintiffs may avoid limitations on
cases based on the duty of care by bringing actions based on the
duty of loyalty.24 5 This presumably would have significant neg-
ative implications for the effectuation of legislative intent.
iii. Appropriate Cost-Bearing Arrangements
Once it becomes apparent that derivative actions are not
necessarily intended to deter wrongful conduct, it also appears
that the conclusion reached with respect to the computation of
fee awards in the section 16(b) context does not automatically
extend by analogy. The objection to awards thus measured is
that they deplete the corporate recovery. Once stripped of its
social value as a deterrent, a suit typically is justified primarily
by its ability to make the real party-in-interest whole. Substan-
tial pecuniary benefits to the lawyer at the expense of the
party-in-interest significantly undercut this goal.m
More interesting, however, is a second possible objection to
contingent fee recoveries approximating the lawyer's risk-ad-
justed costs of bringing an action. This objection is that such
recoveries may provide more incentive for the prosecution of
suits than the system actually wishes to provide.2 4 7 This objec-
tion is valid despite the argument, made above, that suits
brought on contingent fee bases should tend to have formal
merit.248 Even if deterrence is not the primary purpose of a
particular cause of action, the threat of litigation presumably
does have a preventive effect vis a vfs the activities giving rise
to the threat and thus might hamper progressive management
244. See Linsley, Statutory Limitations on Director's Liability in Dela-
ware: A New Look at Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24
HARv. J. ON LEGiS. 527, 552 (1987).
245. See Balotti & Gentile, supra note 241, at 16-17; Shaffer, Delaware's
Limit on Director Liability. How the Marketfor Incorporation Shapes Corpo-
rate Law, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 665, 669 (1987).
246. This problem might be exacerbated when any part of the lawyer's fee
represents a subsidy for unsuccessful claims brought on a contingent basis. See
Rowe, Fee Shifting, supra note 69, at 674-75.
247. Cf. Note, Class Actions, supra note 87, at 1583 (noting that deterrent
effect of statutes increases when individuals refrain from conduct that statute
does not prohibit).
248. See supra text accompanying note 146.
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techniques or nonconservative decision making.24 9 The pros-
pect of liability for every formal transgression might even dis-
courage some individuals from accepting positions, such as
corporate directorships, that would leave them open to suit.2 °
This objection, based on the "overkill" potential of bringing
suits-even those with formal merit-indicates some belief that
courts and legislatures have not yet carefully thought out man-
agement policing devices. 251 It may also indicate, however, the
possible impact of attorney activities on those devices and thus
the importance of integrating the requirements of the relevant
causes of action and those ethical restrictions that may bear
heavily on their enforcement. In this situation, some focus by
legislatures or courts on the appropriate relationship of the in-
centives of potential managers and the incentives of attorneys
should advance the goals underlying the different types of de-
rivative actions. Such a focus is particularly timely in light of
recent legislative efforts to overhaul management liability
schemes.252
IV. SYNTHESIS
The discussion above shows that there is substantial inter-
action between ethical regulation and enforcement of the laws
applicable to section 16(b) and other derivative litigation. This
Part will present a synthesis and restatement of the various ob-
servations and recommendations made with respect to the re-
tooling of this interaction. First, however, this Part will
examine a few broad principles and suggestions relating to the
integration of ethical regulation and generally applicable law.
249. See Herzel & Katz, supra note 241, at 1189; see also Manning, The
Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attentionr: Time for Real-
ity, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1482 (1984) (contrasting decision-making process of
business to that of law).
250. See Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56 (di-
rectors resigning to avoid personal liability); Galante, Corporate Boardroom
Woes Grow, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1 (increased costs and cancellations of
insurance causing directors to examine options). In this regard, it is interest-
ing to note that some causes of action primarily based on deterrence, such as
§ 16(b) actions, may be sufficiently clear-cut to discourage the unwanted activ-
ity, such as short-swing trading, without leading insiders to fear unpredictable
impositions of liability. In other words, one might still accept a directorship,
even if well aware of the possibility of § 16(b) liability, simply as a result of
believing that such liability is relatively well-defined and easy to avoid, and
that if it is imposed, it will result only in loss of profit.
251. The legislative activity described in note 243, supra, and accompany-
ing text also reflects this doubt.
252. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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It is hoped that these general themes will be applied in various
areas where such integration would be helpful, and that their
specific application to section 16(b) and other derivative litiga-
tion will serve as a useful paradigm.
A. BROAD THEMES IN THE INTEGRATION OF ETHICAL
REGULATION AND LAWS OF GENERAL APPLiCABITY
1. Integration and the Need for a Central Decision Maker
This Article has described a few situations in which at least
partial integration of ethical regulation and laws of general ap-
plicability already has occurred. For instance, the constitu-
tional right to free speech has resulted in some relaxation of
rules governing advertising and solicitation.3 The right to as-
sociate freely also has had some effect on ethical regulation.s 4
For the most part, as is the case with these examples, laws of
general applicability simply have placed limits on permissible
regulation when the rights they secure have been impaired.
In at least one area discussed in this Article, however, laws
of general applicability have played a part in bringing about re-
laxation of ethical restrictions on general policy grounds: the
need for contingent expense arrangements in class and deriva-
tive actions undoubtedly contributed to the recent legitimiza-
tion of those arrangements in some states.25 This kind of
interrelationship is valuable, but requires careful scrutiny and
tailoring. For instance, it would be possible to permit or re-
quire contingent fee and expense arrangements in those types
of suits in which such arrangements are necessary for enforce-
ment and play a role in screening for validity, but to continue a
general stance of disapproval in others.256
The main obstacle to a more complete effort to integrate
laws of general applicability and ethical regulation in any given
context is the lack of a central decision maker. Ideally, a cen-
tral decision maker would evaluate the desirability of particular
causes of action and the dangers of various forms of attorney
conduct in such actions, and then would determine the struc-
253. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also supra note 10 (refer-
ring to right to effective counsel).
255. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see generally Findlater,
supra note 70, at 1670 (discussing effect of prohibiting attorneys from advanc-
ing expenses of litigation).
256. The suggestion in the text notwithstanding, the author regards contin-
gent expense arrangements as conceptually indistinguishable from the well-es-
tablished contingent fee, and thus susceptible to regulation on the same terms.
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ture of attorney activities and incentives necessary to achieve
appropriate results. To some extent, Louis Loss's call for public
enforcement of section 16(b) suits was a call for such decision-
making on a limited basis.25 7 If an agency were legislatively es-
tablished, charged with responsibility to enforce all law in a
particular area, and appropriately funded, it could achieve coor-
dination of public policy, attorney incentive, and at least gen-
eral forms of attorney conduct2ss This type of coordination
will not, however, and should not, take place across the board,
even when strong public interests are implicated. Constraints
on the public fisc exist, and private interests in enforcing cer-
tain rights259 preclude turning over all control of litigation to
governmental agencies.
The involvement of courts in approving settlement and
compensation in suits of the type discussed in this Article may
be a crucial aspect of any attempt to deal with the particular
integrative problems described. Nonetheless, it is extremely
unlikely that, in the course of substantive litigation,2 60 courts
will provide the impetus for the needed retooling, either in spe-
cific problem areas or on a general basis.26 1 Apparently, it will
be left to those directly responsible for ethical regulation2 62 to
address the considerations raised in the foregoing pages. It is
257. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
258. One might extend the line of reasoning in the text to the position that,
in some circumstances, there is no reason to cling to such requirements as
standing. Those issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
259. Such a private interest might exist, for instance, with respect to the
prosecution (or, more to the point, nonprosecution) of rights of a highly per-
sonal nature or claims against close friends or relatives.
260. But see infra note 262 (referring to courts' role in ethical rule-
making).
261. This is clear from courts' past hit-or-miss approach to the integration
of attorney behavior and generally applicable law, illustrated by their attempts
to enhance attorney incentives in § 16(b) suits while acknowledging that this
may give cause for discipline by some other body. See supra note 87. There
may be some question about the courts' capability to respond to the considera-
tions raised, as well as about their inclination. For specific criticism of the
Supreme Court's inadequate economic analysis in approving fee awards, see
Rowe, Recent Developments, supra note 52, at 634-37.
262. In most circumstances, of course, this regulation will involve the exer-
cise of the courts' inherent power to regulate lawyers. See generally Com-
ment, Separation of Powers: Who Should Control the Bar?, 47 J. URB. L. 715,
721-23 (1969) (arguing that Michigan legislature should not take control of
legal profession from judicial branch); Note, The Inherent Power of the Judici-
ary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 MNN. L.
REV. 783, 785-87 (1976) (examining doctrine that Minnesota Supreme Court
has exclusive power to regulate practice of law in state).
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hoped that they will do so in a manner more or less in harmony
with the suggestions that follow.
2. Systematic Review
a. The Preventive-Inherent Distinction and Context
Specificity
One important component in the systematic integration of
ethical regulation and generally applicable law is recognition
and approval of the idea that different circumstances may jus-
tify application of different behavioral standards. 263 It is likely
that many instances in which law and regulation are at cross
purposes are the result of attempts to regulate attorney conduct
through broad and generalized rules.
Broad rules may be reasonably appropriate if the conduct
regulated is inherently immoral or undesirable. Although
there may be instances in which an activity that is in and of it-
self extremely undesirable presents an opportunity to achieve
some benefit,264 these circumstances will be relatively rare.
There should be little need to respond to this rarity by provid-
ing in advance for formal exceptions from general prohibitions.
Conversely, if the regulation in question is only preventive
263. Commentators often have remarked that the practice of law involves
application of an ethic that neither nonlawyers nor lawyers do or should apply
in their extra-professional lives. See, e.g., Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1061
(1976); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM.
RTS. 1, 3-4 (1975). Others have strenuously criticized this view. See D'Amato
& Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis L.J. 761, 765-70 (1983);
Dauer & Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 575-
80 (1977). Commentators in the former group have tended to recognize gen-
eral adversarial behavior as appropriate for lawyers even though not broadly
desirable for the populace at large. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 43-49 (1975); see also Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4
STAN. L. REv. 3, 3-6 (1951) (discussing lawyer's duty of loyalty to client). But
see Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (1975) (arguing that adversary system should value search for truth
more highly); Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV.
589, 595-601 (1985) (advocating that attorneys take personal responsibility for
ethical partisanship). If one contemplates that ethics may vary contextually, it
is a short step to subdividing the relevant contexts. In other words, if it is le-
gitimate to establish one ethic for lawyers and another for nonlawyers, it is
not much of a conceptual leap to establish different behavioral guidelines for
lawyers in different situations.
264. One possible example is the making of a false statement in the course
of representation (prohibited by MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 7-102(A)(5)
and MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 4.1(a)) in order to avert a murder or
serious assault.
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in nature, it is more likely to interfere with the attainment of
favorable results on a predictable basis. This distinction means
that it is much more likely that well-tailored exceptions devel-
oped with particular attention to factual context would realize
benefits. In light of this conclusion, attempts to integrate ethi-
cal regulation and generally applicable law should be directed
initially at preventive regulation. Ethical regulators could re-
serve for some date in the future their efforts to deal with reg-
ulation of activities that are inherently immoral or otherwise
undesirable.265
b. The Absolute Limits Imposed by Generally Applicable Law
Any attempt at a systematic review of the integration of
ethical regulation and laws of general applicability would do
well, as a preliminary matter, to identify the absolute limits im-
posed by the latter on the former. For instance, it would be
logical for ethical regulators to commence projects by volunta-
rily examining regulations for constitutional infirmity. Thus,
regulators should search for possible impairment of the rights
of attorneys266 and clients26 7 and, when they identify impair-
265. It is true, of course, that there is considerable opportunity for disa-
greement regarding whether a particular regulation is merely preventive.
Reasonable people probably would agree that embezzlement of client funds is
inherently bad and ethical regulations should forbid it. See MODEL CODE,
supra note 2, DR 9-102 (requiring safekeeping property of client); MODEL
RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.15 (requiring safekeeping property of clients and
third parties); MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting illegal
conduct); MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 8.4(b) (same); MODEL CODE, supra
note 2, DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting dishonesty); MODEL RULES, supra note 2,
Rule 8A(c) (same). But see C. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.72, at 74 (embez-
zling from would-be cockroach benefactor to feed starving people). They
might, however, differ as to whether disclosure of client confidences is an in-
herent betrayal of a trust relationship and thus intrinsically bad, or whether
attorneys should avoid such disclosures simply as a means of enhancing client
trust and willingness to pass enough information on to lawyers to facilitate ef-
fective representation. In partial answer, however, it is important to note that
a number of regulations are clearly preventive, see supra note 3, and that
these regulations alone provide substantial raw material with which the in-
tegrative effort could begin. As the effort proceeds and experience is gained, it
is even possible that the preventive-inherent distinction eventually can be dis-
carded as only a matter of degree. Thus, if analysis concentrates simply on
permitting previously prohibited activities to proceed when opportunity for
harm is limited and occasion for good presented, the need for labels may
disappear.
266. As indicated above, see supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text, the
right most frequently implicated to date has been that of free speech. Even
with respect to this single right there are many unanswered questions.
267. Frequently litigated clients' rights have included freedom of associa-
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ment, should systematically deal with it by means of a test case
or otherwise.268
c. The True Integrative Process
Beyond determining the limits that laws of general applica-
bility impose on ethical regulation lies true integration of the
two. As an initial matter, integration requires identifying the
goals of each in the context of various categories of attorney ac-
tivity. This simple step may, in some cases, reveal instances in
which these goals are congruent. In such cases, nothing more
may be required. In other cases, such as those specifically ad-
dressed in the earlier parts of this Article, examination may re-
veal that, when goals apparently diverge, the goal of the ethical
regulation in question may be irrelevant, or may be attained by
a means not at odds with the policies of generally applicable
law.269 It may be a simple matter to align the two by using the
tools discussed below. There will be instances, however, in
which regulators cannot easily achieve harmony. Although it is
difficult to say without a thorough examination of a variety of
tion, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, and the right to effective coun-
sel, see supra note 10.
268. Ethical regulators should, of course, consider the effects of other laws
of general applicability. For instance, it would be rather easy to develop a
more straightforward approach to the interaction of obstruction of justice stat-
utes and attorneys' obligations with respect to physical evidence. See MODEL
CODE, supra note 2, DR 7-102(A)(3) (prohibiting lawyer from concealing or
knowingly failing to disclose that which "he is required by law to reveal");
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 3.4(a) (prohibiting lawyer from "unlaw-
fully" altering, destroying, or concealing "a document or other material having
potential evidentiary value"); see also Note, Disclosure of Incriminating Phys-
ical Evidence Received from a Client The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 52 U.
COLO. L. REv. 419, 463 (1981) (examining attorney's choices and obligations
when client discloses incriminating evidence); Note, Legal Ethics and the De-
struction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665, 1682-88 (1979) (proposing amendment
to MODEL CODE, supra note 2, addressing destruction of evidence).
Similarly, ethical regulators could, in a straightforward manner, reconcile
a lawyer's obligation under the federal securities laws with obligations to
maintain client confidences. See generally Block & Ferris, SEC Rule 2(e)-A
New Standard for Ethical Conduct or an Unauthorized Web of Ambiguity, 11
CAP. U. L. REV. 501, 527-28 (1982) (examining appropriateness of SEC rule reg-
ulating attorneys); Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Disclosure, Re-
sponsibility, Liability to Investors, and National Student Marketing Corp., 54
NOTRE DANE LAW. 795, 795 (1979) (discussing ethical and legal principles be-
hind attorney liability and responsibility under federal securities laws). It is
important to note, however, that the current lack of resolution in this area is
not attributable to lack of attention.
269. This is especially likely to be true when the ethical regulation in ques-
tion is preventive.
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possible conflicts, it seems quite likely that the appropriate re-
sponse in most cases of actual conflict will be articulation of the
conflict and development of a method for ethical regulation to
defer to the goals of generally applicable law.
d. Available Tools
In those circumstances in which it is appropriate to revise a
particular ethical regulation in light of generally applicable law,
ethical regulators may use a variety of tools. Incentive struc-
turing and the use of rebuttable presumptions are two exam-
ples of such tools.
i. Incentive Structuring
Although incentive structuring is itself a kind of preven-
tive regulation, it can be a much more delicate instrument than
flat prohibition. For instance, ethical regulators may alleviate
concerns with solicitation by developing rules that encourage
the bringing of certain suits on a contingent basis. Conversely,
forbidding the use of contingent fees is one method of control-
ling the number of some types of undesirable suits, short of
completely eliminating a particular cause of action. In fact,
rules aligning self-interest and policy goals are often effective.
Examples of such alignment range from the governmental ide-
als expressed by the founders2 0 to the willingness of courts to
award substantial fees in section 16(b) suits.271 Consequently,
addressing attorney behavior from the standpoint of self-inter-
est need appear neither undignified nor undesirable.
ii. Rebuttable Presumptions
Ethical regulators also should consider casting certain
prohibitions as rebuttable presumptions.2 72 Thus, a rule might
prohibit an act generally, but allow a lawyer to establish, in a
given circumstance, that some set of standards or guidelines
justified the particular act. Although this formulation would
cast some pall over the activities in question even when they
270. Cf. THE FEDERALST No. 51 (J. Madison) (proposing system of separa-
tion of powers as method of check and balance based on self-interest).
271. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
272. In the free speech area, the Supreme Court has distinguished activities
that states can regulate on the basis of possible harm and those that states can
regulate only on the basis of actual harm. See supra notes 127-29 and accom-
panying text. Although the approach suggested in the text might be over-
broad as to the latter, as to the former it might represent a less restrictive
alternative than complete prohibition.
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are desirable, the chilling effect would be less than that which
would result from a complete prohibition.273
B. THE SPECIFIC CASE OF SECTION 16(b) AND OTHER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
1. Preventive Regulation and Context Specificity
The foregoing general discussion easily applies to existing
ethical regulations relating to the instigation of section 16(b)
and other derivative litigation. The two major categories of
such regulation-restrictions on solicitation and the acquisition
of direct financial interests in litigation-are primarily preven-
tive in nature. In light of the earlier discussion regarding pre-
ventive rules, it may be appropriate to vary the rigor with
which these restrictions are applied or to make some other ad-
justment in response to the demands of particular situations-
in other words, context-specific exceptions may be merited.
Exceptions of this sort are exactly the type that ethical regula-
tors should be prepared to take up at this time.
2. The Absolute Limits Imposed by Generally
Applicable Law
Once they have determined that problems in the section
16(b) and other derivative contexts are appropriate for consid-
eration, regulators should consider the extent to which gener-
ally applicable law imposes absolute limits on ethical
regulation. Here, the primary issue involves the free speech
implications of solicitational bans. As discussed above, restric-
tion of solicitation when the dangers of overreaching and mis-
leading are extremely limited arguably abridges the
273. Some will argue that the creation of loopholes is undesirable, and in
many instances this will be true. This Article intends the suggested formula-
tion, however, only for use in the circumstances in which there is some con-
sensus that a loophole is not a bad thing. For instance, it would seem quite
unobjectionable for ethical regulators to provide an exception from solicita-
tional bans when the attorney successfully demonstrates that the solicitational
activity was no more than reasonably necessary to inform the solicited individ-
ual of some right, protection of which is generally in the public interest. Simi-
larly, they might none too controversially choose to prohibit in-person
solicitation except when the lawyer makes the demonstration called for above
or when the cause of action is derivative in nature and not disfavored. This
wording is, of course, uncertain and capable of refinement. At a minimum, the
uncertainty involved would impose some burden on the attorney seeking to
come within the exception. In fact, existing ethical regulations are not them-
selves models of clarity and precision. See Comment, ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C.L. REv. 671, 680-92 (1979).
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constitutional rights of the attorneys whose actions the rules
curtail.274 Solicitation in any type of derivative litigation
presents few, if any, such dangers.2 75 Accordingly, any signifi-
cant curtailment in this area is at least constitutionally dubious.
Given the public policy considerations discussed below, 276 it is
not necessary to draw any final conclusions about constitution-
ality. Nonetheless, any doubts in this regard buttress argu-
ments that ethical regulators should make solicitational rules
less restrictive.
3. The True Integrative Process
Next, it is important to recognize that relaxation or relaxed
enforcement of restrictions on solicitation and acquisition of in-
terests in litigation will contribute to the bringing of suits. In
deciding whether to encourage a more relaxed approach in any
given area, one factor for ethical regulators to consider is
whether a given type of suit is particularly desirable. Another
factor is whether litigation in the context under consideration
actually would present an opportunity for any of the traditional
dangers associated with the regulated activities. A third factor
is whether these activities themselves might present the likeli-
hood of beneficial outcomes.
The first relevant inquiry thus is whether various deriva-
tive causes of action are particularly desirable. For this pur-
pose, it is useful to rank the causes of action discussed above
along a general continuum. Based on various emanations from
legislatures and courts, it appears that section 16(b) suits are
desirable.2 7 Derivative suits are less desirable, although those
premised on violation of the duty of loyalty are more attractive
than those premised on rights against corporate outsiders or on
breach of the duty of care.278
Given this ranking, the next inquiry involves the dangers
and benefits of the regulated activities. In the general context
of derivative litigation, these dangers and benefits are fairly
easy to identify. Solicitation in this area presents few tradi-
tional dangers and it actually may be necessary to overcome the
free-rider problem that frequently occurs.279 The dangers that
274. See supmr text following note 152.
275. See supra notes 139-52, 157-65 and accompanying text.
276. See infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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contingent fee and expense arrangements present also are lim-
ited in the derivative context and required disclosure may mini-
mize them further.20 Moreover, the use of contingent fee and
expense arrangements can be beneficial insofar as such ar-
rangements address free-rider problems and constitute devices
to screen out frivolous suits.281 In addition, at the same time
that these arrangements give an attorney a financial interest in
the outcome of litigation, they create a direct incentive to ana-
lyze derivative litigation for costs and benefits. This analysis is
more likely to approximate a general social perspective than
would any such analysis conducted by a nominal plaintiff, who
distinctly and consistently would be likely to undervalue the
suit's benefits. 2- In fact, the more assurance an attorney has
that courts will not limit recovery of costs by any measure
other than the amount extracted from the defendant, the closer
the approximation is likely to be.2 83
4. The Use of Available Tools and the Integrated Ideal
a. Section 16(b)
Because section 16(b) suits generally are desirable, the dan-
gers that solicitation and acquisition of a direct financial inter-
est present in this context are minimal. These activities
generally are necessary for suit to proceed, and ideal effectua-
tion of public policy in this situation requires that ethical regu-
lations permit solicitation. -84 Public policy also suggests that
any attorney wishing to solicit employment in the section 16(b)
area should be required to offer to accept employment on the
basis of a contingent fee and expense arrangement 285 and to
disclose the arguable dangers associated with such arrange-
ments. If the plaintiff chooses a contingent arrangement, ethi-
cal regulations also should require the attorney to specify that
the amount sought for recompense will approximate the
lawyer's risk-adjusted opportunity costs and out-of-pocket
expenditures.
Presumably, regulators could implement these standards
largely by way of amendment to, or formal interpretation of,
280. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
284. Generally applicable law also may mandate this result as a matter of
absolute limitation. See supra text accompanying notes 274-75.
285. This requirement primarily is a means of ensuring that suits solicited
have formal merit. See supra text accompanying note 281.
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existing ethical codes. 286 The body responsible for implementa-
tion also should undertake a program to thoroughly acquaint
courts with the desirability of "incentive structuring." Thus, in
appropriate circumstances, such as those presented by section
16(b) suits, regulators should encourage courts to allow fee and
expense awards calculated as described above and to approve
settlements at the point at which the attorney's prospective
costs threaten to exceed the comparative benefits.
b. Other Derivative Litigation
In non-16(b) derivative contexts, the dangers that solicita-
tion poses also are limited. The prospect of solicitation in these
suits, however, does present some likelihood that attorneys will
"stir up" litigation without any particular social mandate.
Moreover, although free-rider problems may exist in the prose-
cution of derivative suits, there is no reason to believe that de-
rivative action regularly is necessary to enforce at least those
underlying causes of action accruing against third parties. In
addition, in light of the varying desirability of non-16(b) deriva-
tive suits, the desirability of solicitation also varies. Nonethe-
less, if suits in derivative form are to proceed, solicitation is
helpful and no argument against it is very strong. Moreover,
the conclusion that ethical regulations should not prohibit solic-
itation in these suits has the advantage of avoiding constitu-
tional issues that might otherwise arise.
The reasoning with respect to the acquisition of direct fi-
nancial interests roughly tracks the above discussion relating to
solicitation. The dangers that such acquisitions present are not
great, and contingent fee and expense arrangements will be
necessary for some derivative suits to proceed. It thus appears
that regulations should allow contingent fee and expense ar-
rangements in some form.287 This conclusion does not mean,
however, that attorneys should receive maximum encourage-
ment to bring all derivative suits, or even all those of formal
merit. Accordingly, there is some doubt about answering, in
these circumstances, the call made in the context of section
16(b) suits for the specialized revamping of settlement approv-
als and fee and expense awards.
286. With respect to the significance of ethics opinions issued by various
bar organizations, see C. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.6.6, at 65-67.
287. This might even extend to a requirement that contingent fee and ex-
pense arrangements be offered in some circumstances. See supra note 284 and
accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, distinctions remain to be drawn on the basis
of the desirability and purpose of the different types of suits
under consideration. Thus, revamping fee awards and settle-
ment approvals in derivative actions based on the duty of loy-
alty is appealing. After all, public policy favors such suits
relative to other non-16(b) derivative suits, and the discussion
above characterized the duty of loyalty itself-like section
16(b)-as largely preventive in nature.28s Unfortunately, how-
ever, the lines between the kinds of conduct implicating the
duty of loyalty and those implicating the duty of care are, at
best, indistinct. As noted above, for instance, some commenta-
tors believe that litigation that could be based on breach of the
duty of care may be rather easily recharacterized in terms of
the duty of loyalty.2s 9
One possible response to the difficulty of distinguishing the
causes of action underlying derivative suits is the use of a re-
buttable presumption. In other words, attorneys seeking in
non-16(b) derivative suits to recover fees or settle cases on the
basis of the standards suggested for section 16(b) suits could be
allocated the burden of establishing that the suit implicates
only the duty of loyalty. Even this modest step seems a prema-
ture complication, however, until courts and legislatures thor-
oughly scrutinize the presently changing law of management
liability. The wisest and most efficient course for ethical regu-
lators appears to be simply to wait until the generally applica-
ble law in this area has stabilized. During the waiting period,
however, ethical bodies should bring to the attention of
lawmakers the possible implications of different approaches to
attorney conduct.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that thorough integration of substantive law and
ethical regulation will not be quick or easy. Nonetheless, ex-
isting regulations are neither so extensive nor so strict as to
make the prospect unattainable. Even if integration is slow,
and achieved only on a context-by-context basis, it is a worthy
goal. Moreover, once the legal profession regards integration as
an ideal rather than an aberration, ethical regulators can enlist
formally the aid of courts and legislatures in the endeavor.
Courts can play a crucial role in the integrative process as a
288. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
289. See supra text accompanying note 245.
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result of their power over incentive structuring. ° Their enun-
ciation of public policy, and even their expression of opinion on
the appropriate role that lawyers might play in the effectuation
of such policy, also might be helpful in this process. Similar
statements by the legislature, and considered tailoring of the
substantive and procedural rules relating to various causes of
action, could be of additional use.
No doubt any suggestion that courts or legislatures should
regularly concern themselves with attorney activities-or, in
the case of legislatures, should think about such activities at
all-will represent to some an undesirable attempt to encroach
upon the time-honored custom of attorney self-regulation.291 In
fact, it is possibly the emphasis on professional regulatory au-
tonomy that has prevented a more significant integration of
such regulation with laws of general applicability in the past.292
The heyday of self-regulation passed, however, with the
Supreme Court's first deregulation of advertising in the
1970s.2 9 3 It is now clear that ethical self-regulators are not in-
fallible, and that attorneys may challenge their shortcomings.
In this light, it seems that subjecting their own determinations
to scrutiny and directing scrutiny by others through particular-
ized requests may, in the long run, be the most practical strat-
egy for self-regulators to retain control.
290. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
291. As thus used, serf-regulation primarily contemplates the role of bar
organizations as initiators of regulation. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.3;
see also supra note 262 (referring to courts' exercise of inherent power to regu-
late attorney conduct).
292. With respect to some of the conflicts implicit in self-regulation by the
legal profession, see Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective
on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981).
293. See supra notes 8, 123-24 and accompanying text.
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